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INTRODUCTION 
Many academics, public interest lawyers, and politicians consider it a 
platitude to say that public authorities underfund civil legal services for the 
poor.1  Others have argued for years that the public provision of legal ser-
vices is, almost by definition, wasteful and possibly counterproductive.2  
This disconnect has its roots in deep disagreements about the role of gov-
ernment in the lives of its citizens.  But the confusion between these camps 
in their policy debates stems more directly from the use of amorphous 
terms that have multiple meanings and are thus opaque rather than helpful.  
Specifically, because words like “underfund” and “need” have different 
meanings to different people in different contexts, discussions over the 
proper approach to evaluating the advantages and disadvantages of publicly 
funding legal services have become muddled. 
 
∗ University of Michigan Law School.  Thanks to my colleagues at the University of Michi-
gan for helpful comments and conversations. 
 1. For recent evidence of the practical need for greater civil legal access funding, see 
Keith L. Alexander, Poorer D.C. Residents Lacking Legal Services: Report Suggests Area 
Firms Offer Help, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1. 
 2. See, e.g., Ted Frank, The Trouble with the Civil Gideon Movement, LIABILITY OUT-
LOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y Research, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 7, 2008, at 1-2, 
available at http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.28441/pub_detail.asp. 
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To proponents of expanding legal services, underfunding happens when 
people in need of legal services cannot access these services because there 
are too few low-cost lawyers available.3  “Underfunded” is thus taken to 
mean simply that a person “would benefit from” the greater availability of 
free or subsidized legal aid.  To opponents of the public provision of such 
services, however, programs that misalign incentives or that lead to the mi-
suse of taxpayer money or knock-on costs elsewhere in the legal system 
are, at the end of the day, necessarily “wasteful” and “counterproductive” 
and should be reduced in size or eliminated, second-best arguments not-
withstanding.4  The advantage of both of these approaches to thinking 
about the problem is that they are easy to apply. 
From a policymaker’s perspective, however, these strategies are unhelp-
ful.  Public resources are limited, and so the fact that people are “in need” 
or “would benefit from” additional funding is not sufficient to justify a shift 
in the allocation of public monies toward legal aid.5  After all, applying the 
same analysis to other public services, we would of course learn that there 
are plenty of other people and institutions (e.g., the homeless, the educa-
tional system, community health centers, etc.) that are “in need” of scarce 
resources.6  At the same time, expanding government involvement in the 
 
 3. Alternatively, underfunding might occur when there is “unequal access” to the jus-
tice system.  See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE 
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1 (2d ed. 2007) [herei-
nafter LSC, JUSTICE GAP].  For “unequal access” to occur, there must be someone “in need” 
of a lawyer and it must be the case that someone similarly situated, but with the necessary 
financial resources, would find it worthwhile to hire a lawyer.  People can often benefit 
from a lawyer’s advice but, even if financially able, may still be unwilling to pay for that 
advice, perhaps because they are reasonably certain of the right path or the costs of making 
a mistake are low. 
 4. Second-best theory asserts that, under certain conditions, two “wrongs” can be better 
than just one “wrong”: if the first-best arrangement of rules is not possible because of some 
deep, unavoidable market failure, the next best arrangement may involve multiple depar-
tures from the first-best arrangement, rather than just the one unavoidable failure. 
 5. See Robert H. Frank, Why is Cost-Benefit Analysis So Controversial?, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 913, 914 (2000) (“Scarcity is a simple fact of the human condition.  To have more of 
one good thing, we must settle for less of another.  Claiming that different values are in-
commensurable simply hinders clear thinking about difficult trade-offs.”).  For a discussion 
of priority setting and rationing in the legal aid context, see generally Richard Moorhead, 
Legal Aid in the Eye of a Storm: Rationing, Contracting, and a New Institutionalism, 25 J.L. 
SOC’Y 365 (1998). 
 6. I assume throughout that there are good reasons for government interventions in 
these areas—that the market alone will not allocate resources efficiently and that the social 
benefits of providing these services at least at low levels are very substantial.  In Part V, I 
suggest that the public provision of legal services to low-income individuals may be welfare 
enhancing, even if the market does not provide these services on its own.  I focus on indi-
vidual services (as opposed to reform efforts and large class actions), but legal services pro-
PRESCOTT_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:44 PM 
2010] CALCULATING ACCESS BENEFITS 305 
 
provision of legal services certainly can lead to real improvements in social 
welfare, even if certain market incentives are dulled and agency and admin-
istrative costs are all but guaranteed, when we face any of a raft of possible 
market failures or have specific distributional preferences. 
Accordingly, policymakers require something more than these imprecise 
all-or-nothing rules (“any” benefit or “unnecessarily” costly) to make op-
timal allocation decisions.  Welfare economics suggests a possible, albeit 
controversial, approach: calculate the net benefits of a government-funded 
legal services program and compare those benefits to the net benefits that 
would be generated by other public programs or by leaving the resources in 
private hands.7  If the legal services program produces more net benefits 
than other options, it should be expanded.  If not, the program’s funding 
should be cut or, potentially, eliminated.8 
In this invited essay, I explore how policymakers and other public-
interested actors have empirically calculated the benefits of providing low-
income access to legal services in the past, and how they might improve 
upon existing methods going forward.  Specifically, I review, criticize, and 
try to build on two major civil justice needs studies, one published by the 
Legal Services Corporation in 2005 (reissued in 2007) and the other by the 
American Bar Association in 1994.9  Because I do not intend these criti-
cisms of the LSC and ABA studies to suggest that legal services programs 
ought to be reduced in size (in fact, an improved study could provide strong 
and reliable evidence favoring greater funding of such services), I also 
briefly criticize assertions that the public provision of services is necessari-
ly counterproductive. 
Welfare economics and, in particular, cost-benefit analysis provide the 
framework for my discussion, although many find these approaches unsa-
 
vided to a few individuals can lead to positive systemic change, making legal services a 
public good requiring a subsidy.  See DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 11 (2004) 
(“[L]aw is a public good.  Protecting legal rights often has value beyond what those rights 
are worth to any single client.”). 
 7. Doing so may improve decision making, but even economists believe that it “is nei-
ther necessary nor sufficient for designing sensible public policy.”  KENNETH J. ARROW ET 
AL., AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RESEARCH, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY REGULATION: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 1 (1996) [herei-
nafter ARROW, PRINCIPLES]. 
 8. Importantly, this analysis can indicate the direction change should take—expand or 
contract—but not necessarily show by how much.  It would be wrong to assume that there is 
a linear relationship between money invested and net benefits.  To be done appropriately, 
separate comparisons should be conducted at all funding levels under consideration. 
 9. LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3; CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVS. & THE PUB., AM. 
BAR ASS’N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS, MAJOR FINDINGS 
FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (1994) [hereinafter ABA, LEGAL NEEDS]. 
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tisfactory on both ethical and methodological grounds.10  Even granting the 
seriousness of these objections for purposes of argument, it would be diffi-
cult for critics to gainsay the relevance of cost-benefit analysis to many po-
licymakers considering increasing, reducing, or eliminating the funding for 
legal services programs.  More importantly, while justice or some other 
fundamental value may, in the views of many, require expanding legal aid 
to satisfy indigent needs whatever the “costs” and “benefits,” assessing how 
much we are willing to sacrifice to satisfy this moral imperative can only 
deepen our understanding of the importance of this value. 
This paper proceeds in five parts.  First, I briefly explain the optimal ap-
proach to allocating public funds from a welfare economics perspective.  
Second, I introduce the challenges of valuing “benefits” in the context of 
the public provision of legal services.  Third, I summarize and critique ex-
isting attempts to quantify the benefits of and need for legal services fund-
ing.11  Fourth, I briefly, but critically, assess the arguments on the other 
side of the legal services debate, where commentators regularly rely on 
anecdotes and empirically unverified assumptions to argue for reducing the 
public provision of legal services.12  Finally, I describe the basic methods 
that cost-benefit analysis employs to crack the difficult nut of measuring 
the value of publicly provided services generally, and I sketch a few ideas 
for how a researcher might design and conduct a study using these ideas to 
 
 10. I do not rehash these important debates.  For discussions of the moral assumptions 
and foundational principles underlying cost-benefit analysis, see LARRY LOHMANN, COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WHOSE INTEREST, WHOSE RATIONALITY? (1997); Matthew Adler, In-
commensurability and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371 (1998); Matthew D. 
Adler & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Pers-
pectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837 (2000); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165 (1999) [hereinafter Adler & Posner, Rethinking 
CBA]; Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique (with Replies), AEI J. ON 
GOV’T & SOC’Y REG., Jan.–Feb. 1981; Peter Railton, Costs and Benefits of Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 1 PROC. BIENNIAL MEETINGS PHIL. SCI. ASS’N 261 (1982); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., 
Ethical Benefit-Cost Analysis (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Urban 
Law Journal). 
 11. I am brief in my review of attempts to justify expanding legal services.  Scholarship 
goes back a long way.  See, e.g., Guvenc G. Alpander & Jordan I. Kobritz, Prepaid Legal 
Services: An Emerging Fringe Benefit, 31 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 172, 173-75 (1978); 
Emery A. Brownell, Availability of Low Cost Legal Services, 287 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. 
& SOC. SCI. 120, 121-22 (1953); cf. F. Raymond Marks, Some Research Perspectives for 
Looking at Legal Need and Legal Services Delivery Systems: Old Forms or New?, 11 LAW 
& SOC’Y REV. 191 (1976). 
 12. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 26 (“The basis for this diagnosis [that legal services 
generate more harm than good] is largely anecdotal. . . . The public gets anecdotal glimpses 
of atypical cases without a sense of their overall significance.”) (citation omitted). 
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measure (at least some of) the benefits of providing access to legal services 
to low-income individuals. 
I.  “OPTIMAL” ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC RESOURCES 
In a perfect world, according to welfare economists, policymakers would 
make funding allocation decisions by employing a cost-benefit approach 
that fully captured all relevant costs and benefits of funding all possible 
public enterprises.13  For a given pot of money, these calculations would 
yield an allocation that maximized society’s total net benefit by arranging 
funding so that the marginal net benefit for each enterprise was the same.  
If this marginal-net-benefit-generated-per-dollar-spent (i.e., the return on 
public investment) was significantly higher than private lending markets 
demanded for private investments, one could argue that, under certain con-
ditions, government should increase its investments by raising additional 
tax revenue.14 
It makes practical sense to speak of net benefits in monetary rather than 
utility terms.  This is very unfortunate in a way, because if costs and bene-
fits were denominated in utility terms, distributional issues would become 
significantly less important: under normal conditions, an allocation that 
equalized the marginal utility of government spending across individuals 
would be optimal, so more money and programs would, as a general mat-
ter, be directed toward those with less.  Unfortunately, a utility metric is 
unworkable in practice because marginal utility is tough to measure in any-
thing other than monetary terms. 
 
 13. A policymaker should consider not just the scale but also the nature of a public 
project.  We would, for example, like to evaluate all possible means of providing low-
income individuals access to the civil justice system, and not simply whether we should in-
crease our investment in a “staff attorney” approach.  There are other models (e.g., judicare, 
pro bono programs, etc.) and implementation approaches to consider.  See, e.g., Heribert A. 
Hirte, Access to the Courts for Indigent Persons: A Comparative Analysis of the Legal 
Framework in the United Kingdom, United States and Germany, 40 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 91 
(1991); see also Samuel Jan Brakel, Styles of Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor: A Re-
view Article, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219 (1977) (reviewing TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES (Mauro Cappelletti, James Gord-
ley & Earl Johnson, Jr. eds., 1975)); cf. Maaike De Langen & Maurits Barendrecht, Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor: Innovating Access to Justice, in THE STATE OF ACCESS: SUCCESS 
AND FAILURE OF DEMOCRACIES TO CREATE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 250-71 (Jorrit de Jong & 
Gowher Rizvi eds., 2008). 
 14. For an introduction to the foundational assumptions of cost-benefit analysis, see 
generally ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: CONCEPTS AND PRAC-
TICE 26-33 (3d ed. 2006).  See also EDWARD M. GRAMLICH, A GUIDE TO BENEFIT-COST 
ANALYSIS 30-45 (2d ed. 1990); John D. Blum, Ann Damsgaard & Paul R. Sullivan, Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 33 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. 137 (1980). 
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Maximizing wealth (i.e., conducting cost-benefit analysis in monetary 
terms), on the other hand, can exacerbate distributional concerns.  For ex-
ample, if a program serving the rich generated more net benefits (in dollar 
terms) than a program serving the poor, cost-benefit analysis would support 
funding the rich program as the more efficient option because it maximizes 
overall wealth, even if the wealth generated by the program were to wind 
up entirely in rich hands.15 
A corollary of making a wealth maximizing choice, however, is that 
there must always be enough new wealth for the beneficiary group to (at 
least) fully compensate any group that suffers from the decision.16  In other 
words, in the context of an allocation decision, efficient decisions are those 
that can, with redistribution occurring elsewhere, make everyone better off.  
This means we may be able to ignore distributional concerns when focusing 
on a particular reform or public project regardless of the metric we use to 
measure benefits, as long as allocation decisions are complemented by a 
separate policy or policies designed to “undo” any distributional losses.17 
If we knew what the final wealth-maximizing allocation looked like in 
the perfect world described above, we could be precise: legal services 
would be underfunded if they received less public support than the perfect-
world allocation would dictate.  But we do not live in such a world—and 
getting there would cost too much and require too much guesswork.  So, as 
a practical matter, we have to come up with a more tractable approach to 
making allocation decisions. 
A simplistic substitute approach would analyze each project separately 
and ask only whether additional funding would generate “any” benefits.  
The advantage of this type of rule, as noted in the introduction, is that it is 
easy to apply.  We can be fairly unconcerned about details.  We can gener-
ally ignore minor benefits and costs and mismeasure important ones be-
cause these mistakes very rarely matter.  On the other hand, mistakes do 
not matter only because the “any benefit” criterion will almost always indi-
cate that more money is merited.  More funding will rarely hurt intended 
 
 15. Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 
359 (2004). 
 16. See GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 30-33; Joseph Persky, Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
the Classical Creed, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 199 (2001). 
 17. This is a big “as long as,” but one on which I do not focus in this paper because it is 
a general issue with cost-benefit analysis.  See, e.g., Frank, supra note 5, at 916-17, 921-27; 
Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definitions, Justification, and Comment on Con-
ference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153-56 (2000).  Although this is the “standard” 
defense, many commentators reject it.  See Adler & Posner, Rethinking CBA, supra note 10, 
at 187-94. 
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beneficiaries or any third parties who happen to be affected.  This is not 
always true—too many cooks can spoil the broth—but, for all intents and 
purposes, the rule is just about useless as an allocation rule. 
A better method would be to ask whether, at a minimum, the “net” bene-
fit of a public investment exceeds zero.  Even better still would be to re-
quire that the net benefit of a project surpass the return the private market 
for capital would demand.18  By taxing people, the government removes 
funds that would otherwise be directed by the capital markets to their 
“best” private use.  Therefore, if the benefits generated by the public ser-
vices at the margin do not exceed the value of private projects waiting in 
the wings,19 one concerned with maximizing the total size of the pie would 
argue against additional funding.20  The money could be better used else-
where (and then redistributed, if necessary).  Refunding it to taxpayers 
would be better policy, according to welfare economics, than putting addi-
tional funds toward this particular investment. 
This approach to allocation, too, is far from perfect.  It will fail when the 
net benefits of the public service in question exceed the return demanded 
by private capital markets but not the benefits that would be created by 
 
 18. Taxation generates dead weight loss if those taxed alter their behavior in response to 
the tax.  See GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 48-51.  Assuming that public funds come from the 
taxation of labor, we would want to account for this dead weight loss in making our alloca-
tion decisions.  Assuming that some market failure (a public goods problem, for example) 
keeps private markets from providing the public services in question, for some level of at 
least some possible public services, the net benefit generated will exceed the market rate of 
return plus the deadweight loss caused by the required taxation.  See BOARDMAN ET AL., su-
pra note 14, at 103-06. 
 19. This assumes that the costs and benefits of private projects are fully internalized by 
borrowers.  If not, we might want to impose an appropriate Pigovian tax. 
 20. Again, thinking about the problem this way explicitly ignores distributional con-
cerns.  But policymakers obviously care not just about the total size of the pie but how that 
pie is divided.  See, e.g., ARROW, PRINCIPLES, supra note 7, at 6 (“Principle 7: While bene-
fit-cost analysis should focus primarily on the overall relationship between benefits and 
costs, a good benefit-cost analysis will identify important distributional consequences of a 
policy.”); GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 229 (“Politicians have to make decisions that create 
gainers and losers. . . . It should be a routine requirement of benefit-cost analysis that all dis-
tributions of gains and losses for various groups be shown.”).  We can (partially) deal with 
this hitch in two ways.  First, we can explicitly value distributional outcomes in monetary 
terms and treat improvements as a social benefit.  See GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 115-31; 
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences 
Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1135-41 (2000) [hereinafter Adler & Posner, Im-
plementing CBA].  Second, we can focus solely on maximizing total wealth in the allocation 
of services funding and compensate relatively worse off individuals by explicitly redistribut-
ing.  See Frank, supra note 5, at 916-17; supra text accompanying nn.14-17. 
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some other public investment.21  Welfare economics would counsel that we 
compare the net benefits of increasing access to legal services, say, not on-
ly to the net benefits that could be generated by private actors but also to all 
other potential projects to which the government might put the money.  In 
fact, if the marginal net benefit of an additional dollar is significantly lower 
for certain other projects (say, “bridges to nowhere” in progress some-
where), our comparison would indicate that we should reallocate funds 
from those projects toward fostering greater access.  Of course, this exer-
cise is informationally demanding to say the least, but would bring us clos-
er to the perfect-world allocation. 
II.  IDENTIFYING AND MEASURING BENEFITS (AND COSTS) OF LEGAL 
SERVICES PROGRAMS 
The important take-away from the above discussion is that properly cal-
culating the approximate net benefits of any governmental program is es-
sential to the allocation problem faced by policymakers.  With the excep-
tion of the “any benefit” rule, where we can probably get by with 
guesswork, taking the time to measure the costs and benefits of a project as 
accurately as possible has real payoffs in terms of the efficient use of li-
mited resources. 
This conclusion, however, begs two important questions.  First, what are 
the costs and benefits created by a publicly subsidized legal services pro-
gram?  Second, how do we go about valuing these costs and benefits? 
Answering these questions is, unfortunately, non-trivial, which may ac-
count for the failure of many proponents of expanding legal aid programs 
to move past the “in need” or “any benefit” sorts of decision rules, and the 
unwillingness of many opponents of publicly provided legal access to 
move beyond anecdotes.22  In this essay, I attempt to explore these two 
 
 21. Critics of using legal services approaches—e.g., government-funded staff attorneys 
who work only on civil legal aid matters—often take this approach, by maintaining that 
there are alternative ways to provide better access to justice to disadvantaged individuals at 
lower cost.  These arguments are important, but ultimately empirical in nature, and we 
would be better served by methods (rather than rhetoric) to determine the net benefit differ-
ences, if any, between various possible legal aid approaches. 
 22. Once we have a handle on the answers to these questions, policymakers will still be 
required to make judgments about which costs and benefits to “weigh” and whether to value 
the costs and benefits of various affected parties (participants and nonparticipants) equally.  
For a discussion of whose benefits ought to be included in the calculus, see William N. 
Trumbull, Who Has Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 9 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 201 
(1990) and, for a brief treatment, Part V below.  Consider, for example, whether any new 
costs borne by legal wrongdoers ought to receive the same weight as costs imposed on 
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questions but not answer them.  By describing a few of the obvious costs 
and benefits of a legal services program (leaving room open for future ad-
ditions to the list), and then providing either an explicit assumption or a 
measurement method that can get us to a final “net benefit” number, I hope 
to prompt future researchers to catalogue the costs and benefits of these 
programs fully and to develop further measurement approaches. 
To characterize the relevant costs and benefits of legal services pro-
grams, it is necessary first to think about what we hope improved access to 
the civil justice system would achieve.  There are at least three categories 
of goals: (1) supplying solutions to the legal problems of low-income indi-
viduals (resolution/compensation) when they occur, (2) reducing the num-
ber of legal problems faced by low-income individuals in the first place 
(planning/deterrence), and (3) providing low-income individuals with the 
knowledge that they have access to legal advice and representation should 
they need it (freedom/insurance).23 
Put differently, proponents of legal services believe that if low-income 
individuals have access to legal representation and advice, any legal issue 
(e.g., adoption) or dispute (e.g., employment discrimination) can be han-
dled more effectively and at significantly lower personal cost, and therefore 
be resolved in a more satisfactory way.  If the provision of low-cost legal 
services will lead to legal issues being resolved differently ex post (in terms 
of outcome or cost), then we should also expect there to be ex ante beha-
vioral consequences as well.  First, for those issues that involve a legal dis-
pute, the other party’s behavior may change in anticipation of the fact that 
low-income individuals can secure representation and/or legal advice.  In 
the case of a wrongdoer, for example, we may see deterrence of wrongful 
behavior.24  In other cases, we may see more caretaking.  Second, we 
should see low-income individuals taking greater advantage of their pre-
viously unenforceable legal entitlements (e.g., applying for a job with an 
employer with a reputation for discrimination), at least if they are aware of 
the low-cost legal services available to them.  Third, even if a low-income 
 
clients who have been wronged.  Simple rules (e.g., “ignore wrongdoer costs and benefits”) 
make cost-benefit calculations easier but only at the risk of making them less accurate. 
 23. In addition to providing insurance benefits (the cognitive benefit of reduced risk of 
an insoluble legal difficulty) and freedom benefits (the gains of freedom of action made 
possible by insurance), low-income legal services may provide dignitary benefits—simply 
knowing that one may rely on competent representation, like those who are better situated 
do, may have value.  Indeed, having rights with representation may be considered an impor-
tant part of being a valued and full citizen.  See RHODE, supra note 6, at 9.  Legal aid pro-
grams may target all of these (e.g., law reform through lobbying or class action lawsuits) to 
the chagrin of their opponents. 
 24. See id. at 11. 
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individual never makes “use” of low-cost services in his lifetime and does 
not change his behavior, there may be a benefit to him simply in knowing 
that, had a legal issue emerged, help would have been available.25 
All of these behavioral and psychological changes have costs and bene-
fits.  Moreover, conditional on the existence of a dispute, a “better” resolu-
tion (if it involves a damages award) may be thought just a transfer and not 
a new benefit at all.  It thus bears repeating that measuring and adding to-
gether all of these costs and benefits is no easy feat.  Still, in certain con-
texts and under particular market conditions, it may be possible to get ac-
ceptably close to quantifying the relevant costs and benefits accurately 
(particularly, costs) or at least improve upon existing measures used to eva-
luate the value of a program. 
To see where we can make progress, I start with how we might measure 
costs.  Fortunately, for many of a government program’s direct costs, valu-
ation turns out to be somewhat tractable if we assume that the relevant 
markets for goods, labor, and office space are competitive, and that the 
government program in question is relatively small.26  If these assumptions 
are correct, then we can use easily ascertained market indicators (i.e., pric-
es), as opposed to difficult-to-estimate demand and supply schedules, to 
calculate many of the values we need to know.27  Most of the direct costs of 
a legal services program can be handled in this way because such programs 
require competitively provided inputs. 
To see this, note that legal services programs, funded by the government 
to provide free legal advice and other services to low-income individuals, 
function like many other white collar service jobs.  Legal services pro-
grams will have to have office space, and will have to hire lawyers and 
staff.  The office will need desks, computers, office supplies, and access to 
legal documents.  Many of these goods and services are distributed through 
competitive markets or the equivalent.28  Moreover, providers have signifi-
 
 25. We could go further and explore whether this sort of insurance would cause moral 
hazard—for example, by leading low-income individuals to do less than they might other-
wise do to avoid disputes at low cost.  The effects of moral hazard in insurance contexts are 
well known and make the net benefits of any program that much more difficult to measure 
properly. 
 26. Monopolies and unions exist, and governments provide many inputs to projects.  As 
a consequence, for many government programs that are big or are important consumers of 
particular goods, the cost valuation becomes more difficult.  See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra 
note 14, at 80-81. 
 27. See id. at 94-95; GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 225-27. 
 28. This is an approximation.  Paper and pens are competitively provided, but lawyers 
may not be.  Lawyers, as a group, have market power, but public interest lawyers do not 
seem, in general, to be demanding excessive rents, although this is conjecture on my part.  
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cant flexibility in how to organize production—hold up costs seem unlikely 
to be a serious concern.  Therefore, to estimate the social costs of these in-
puts, we need only examine their prices and quantities—in other words, the 
program’s budget.29 
There are other “indirect” costs that are more demanding to assess, how-
ever.  Presumably the provision of advice leads, at least on occasion, to 
changes in a client’s legal strategy.  This may increase costs on the other 
side of the transaction, assuming there is another “side” that can change its 
litigation or negotiating behavior in response to the client’s new approach.  
For example, in a housing dispute, a tenant who receives legal advice might 
give up (lowering costs on the other side) or might employ a new strategy, 
causing the landlord to either give up (lowering costs) or fight harder (rais-
ing costs).  In theory, however, if we can identify these input costs, we can 
price them—the landlord may use an attorney who charges an hourly rate 
in a competitive legal environment, for example. 
A change in an opponent’s litigation approach is one thing, but what 
about underlying changes in an opponent’s primary behavior in anticipa-
tion of possible litigation?  In the landlord hypothetical, a full accounting of 
the costs and benefits of the provision of legal services would take into ac-
count the behavioral changes induced by the fact that low-income individu-
als now have access to low-cost lawyers.  This might mean that we never 
see the hypothesized litigation—instead, the landlord might anticipate the 
outcome (e.g., if he tries to evict, the tenant will obtain representation, fight 
the eviction, and win) and so choose a path that the landlord would not 
have traveled had he not faced a tenant with legal counsel.  Alternatively, 
perhaps the landlord invests in writing a better lease agreement, so that he 
can eventually succeed at evicting the client, but now at higher cost.30 
 
There are barriers to entry (law school and possibly overly exacting licensing exams), but it 
is unclear whether those barriers bind in the legal services setting in a way that allows public 
interest lawyers to demand supra-competitive salaries.  Still, many reformers have suggested 
increasing the number of ways that low-income individuals can meet their legal needs other 
than by using a lawyer, or at least other than by using a lawyer in a traditional way.  See, 
e.g., RHODE, supra note 6, at 79-102. 
 29. GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 227 (“[The valuing the costs] step is normally easier 
than valuing the gains.  For most projects, even including human investment projects, these 
costs are simply budget costs, or are well-estimated by budget costs.”).  For a relevant ex-
ample, see LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST 3, A-9 (2008) [herei-
nafter LSC, 2009 BUDGET REQUEST], which includes line items such as personnel costs, 
communications, printing and reproduction, and travel. 
 30. If this sort of outcome were common, this flaw in the substantive protections af-
forded tenants would seriously reduce the value of legal services.  If it is possible for lan-
dlords (or others) to re-arrange their transactions (at a cost) to ensure success in future litiga-
tion, then legal services programs would just generate more costs in the form of “avoidance” 
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Again, in theory, we can price some of these costs.  If the landlord hires 
a lawyer to redraft his lease, we can add that to total costs of the legal ser-
vices program.  If the landlord will spend two additional hours trying to de-
rail or defeat possible future litigation (regardless whether any litigation 
arises), we can price that too—by estimating the value of the landlord’s 
time using his wage (or some related method).31  But if the landlord is 
made worse off in some other fashion (e.g., tenants who fight back just irri-
tate landlords), we have fewer options.  One possibility would be to ignore 
costs that are imposed on wrongdoers.  But what about those intangible 
costs that are imposed on landlords by tenants who are, objectively, in the 
wrong?  Here, we would need to use a more complicated (and less reliable) 
method for valuing non-market costs.32 
Thus, many of the costs of a legal services program are difficult to calcu-
late, and the above discussion captures just the tip of the iceberg.  For in-
stance, if courts or other non-competitively priced government services are 
complements to legal services or to the behavioral changes of clients or 
non-clients, we must incorporate the cost to the government (rather than the 
price charged, if any) of the additional services employed (e.g., courts and 
judges).  Still, because most direct inputs into a legal aid program can be 
(roughly) accounted for by using the budget expenditures of the program 
and of those individuals directly affected by the provision of those services, 
we can make progress at estimating costs.  At the very least, we can calcu-
late a lower bound that benefits must exceed. 
Calculating the benefits of a legal services program is even more taxing 
than trying to get a grip on the costs.  Above, I described how, in a compet-
itive market, we can use prices to estimate the opportunity cost of using a 
resource to provide these services.  A similar argument appears to apply 
when thinking about benefits.  Consider any monetary benefits produced by 
a program for a client in a dispute—for example, a damages award, a fine 
reduction, or a change in a payment schedule.  These may be the most sig-
nificant “benefits” generated for low-income clients by legal services pro-
 
with few, if any, benefits (especially once low-income individuals recognize they cannot 
win).  Most likely, some landlords will find it too costly to avoid all litigation and so will 
behave “better.” 
 31. One could think of these kinds of costs as attributable to the underlying right granted 
to low-income individuals, rather than as costs attributable to legal services programs.  Both 
rights and representation are necessary for a low-income individual to benefit from legal 
services.  Without any rights or freedoms, a legal services program would be trivially inex-
pensive. 
 32. Specifically, we could employ either contingent valuation survey methods or meas-
ures that rely on behavior to measure non-monetary costs imposed on potential defendants 
and others, see infra Part V, but doing so is unlikely to be as straightforward. 
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grams.  Because these benefits are denominated in dollars, they seem, at 
first glance, easy to take into account and aggregate. 
The problem, however, is that many monetary benefits are simply trans-
fers—they are not new value.  For every winner there must be a loser, and 
so we require an additional assumption to go further.  For instance, we 
could simplify this problem by assuming that money in the hands of a 
wrongdoer is worth nothing.33  Of course, this cannot be quite right, be-
cause the wrongdoer will enjoy his wealth by buying goods from others, 
generating producer surplus (i.e., benefits) elsewhere.34  There will also be 
situations where a client’s “success” is unmerited—probabilistically, we 
know mistakes will occur, and we should account for them.  In general, po-
licymakers will be required to make normative judgments about how much 
weight society will put on these market-measured benefits and costs, at 
least if we want to incorporate those values into our calculations.  Cost-
benefit analysis has nothing to say about these weighting decisions. 
Caveats aside, measuring the costs of competitively-produced inputs and 
valuing monetary benefits is, in theory, straightforward, at least if policy-
makers make any required judgments on how to value transfers, whose 
costs and benefits matter, etc.35  But that leaves the tough part—valuing the 
other benefits (and costs) created by the program that are unrelated to ex 
post monetary (or at least countable) outcomes.36 
 
 33. Frank, supra note 5, at 914; see also Trumbull, supra note 22, at 210-12 (discussing 
whether and how to value the gains from criminal activity, which is analogous to the 
wrongdoer in the example I describe). 
 34. For the reverse argument—that the government provision of legal services will gen-
erate positive spillover effects for the rest of the economy—see Laura K. Abel & Susan 
Vignola, Economic and Other Benefits Associated with the Provision of Civil Legal Aid 3-5 
(Nov. 10, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1503009). 
 35. Cf. LSC, 2009 BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 29, at 12.  I have been unable to locate 
a legal services organization that reports success in terms of monetary awards or other trans-
fers received by its low-income clients.  Other government organizations, like the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), do report such information.  See U.S. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC LITIGATION STATISTICS, FY 1997 
THROUGH FY 2009, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/ 
litigation.cfm.  For many areas of service (e.g., family disputes), damage awards may be 
rare, possibly skewing policymakers’ evaluations.  In any event, the size and regularity of 
awards can be recorded and analyzed in future studies were policymakers to require it. 
 36. For a recent summary of more easily measurable benefits, see generally Abel & 
Vignola, supra note 34.   Abel and Vignola describe many studies that seek to measure the 
benefits of particular legal aid programs in numerical terms—the number of additional food 
stamp recipients or the number of avoided domestic violence incidents, for example.  These 
studies often use available price information to estimate some of a program’s benefits in 
dollar terms in order to make comparisons to the program’s costs possible.  If legal services 
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For the remainder of this essay, I concentrate on attempts to measure 
non-monetary benefits produced by legal services programs.37  Valuing 
non-market and non-monetary outcomes is where cost-benefit methodolo-
gists have focused their attention, and a number of (admittedly imperfect) 
approaches now exist to value them.38  In Part V, I discuss these approach-
es generally and sketch out how they might be applied to legal services.  
But it may help to provide two simple examples of the basic problem of va-
luing benefits, ones that abstract away from the other valuing methods de-
scribed above. 
Imagine an individual who had received food stamps for some period of 
time, but who was recently declared ineligible.  The individual cannot de-
 
are thought to prevent a specific harm such as the commission of a crime, and that harm 
creates or entails measurable costs (e.g., detention costs, legal costs, etc.), then the program 
can be described as creating benefits by allowing these funds to be reallocated to their next 
best use.  Of course, those benefits and costs that cannot be counted or measured are usually 
ignored. 
 37. There may be important costs to legal services programs that will be neglected by 
focusing only on the budgets of the programs themselves, of complementary government 
programs, and of other litigants.  See infra Part IV.  Critics of publicly provided legal ser-
vices have argued that these programs have increased welfare dependency, made public 
housing unworkable, and so on.  See Kenneth F. Boehm, The Legal Services Program: Un-
accountable, Political, Anti-Poor, Beyond Reform and Unnecessary, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. 
L. REV. 321 (1998).  Standard social science program evaluation methods could be used to 
determine whether, for example, expanded access to legal aid leads to more crime, more 
drug use, more teen pregnancy, and more broken homes.  If evidence of such a causal rela-
tionship exists, policymakers can try to monetize these costs (perhaps in terms of the costs 
of the solutions to these new problems) and add them to the total to be balanced against the 
benefits of legal aid.  See Abel & Vignola, supra note 34.  There are also likely to be unanti-
cipated costs.  The difficulty is to demonstrate the relationship of the government program 
in question to these costs.  So far, the argument has largely consisted of anecdote.  Legal aid 
programs may also lead to less crime, less homelessness, etc.  These benefits may also be 
measurable using program evaluation methods. See Abel & Vignola, supra note 34, for a 
description of recent research focusing on benefits.  Of particular interest in this vein are 
studies that use random assignment approaches—essentially, certain potential clients are 
randomly selected to receive assistance while other potential clients are refused—to meas-
ure consequences.  See Abel & Vignola, supra note 34, at 10-11.  Where conditions are ap-
propriate, careful studies are likely to generate reliable estimates, but only of those conse-
quences the researchers seek to measure, and comparing benefits to costs will still require 
monetization. 
 38. If we measure willingness-to-pay (“WTP”), see infra Part V, it is important to re-
member that WTP will reflect the fact that, in some states of the world, clients might receive 
monetary awards or other value when they otherwise would not have.  This generates a 
double-counting problem.  We do not want to make some valuation decision for a damages 
award (a transfer) and then add that to our estimated WTP.  We also cannot just ignore the 
transfer, unless we take into account the WTP of the loser.  Often, however, legal services 
provide support for a legal transaction that generates only “new value” (e.g., an adoption) 
without creating an offsetting loss. 
PRESCOTT_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:44 PM 
2010] CALCULATING ACCESS BENEFITS 317 
 
termine by himself whether the decision was correct under applicable regu-
lations, and cannot afford a lawyer.  The individual seeks out a free legal 
services provider where a lawyer evaluates his case and determines that, in 
fact, the individual is no longer eligible.  There is value to the service, but 
how do we value it? 
Next, consider a different individual who receives a notice in the mail 
stating that the rules determining eligibility for food stamps have changed.  
The individual does not know whether those rules affect his eligibility, but 
he is aware that he cannot afford a lawyer if his food stamps do not show 
up the next month.  Fortunately, the individual knows that there are free le-
gal services that will help him if he finds himself in need.  Much like insur-
ance, this knowledge in and of itself has value.  But, again, how do we val-
ue it? 
These scenarios fit into the structure above.  Legal services programs 
have ex post and ex ante goals.  Ex post benefits occur when a program 
improves the outcome of a dispute or facilitates a transaction.  In these two 
examples, this important benefit is absent by construction.  But, the provi-
sion of legal services also generates a host of ex ante benefits—by improv-
ing the lives and opportunities of low-income individuals, either by allow-
ing them to take advantage of their previously unenforceable or 
unaffordable legal rights, by improving the behavior of others in ways that 
inure to their benefit, or simply by giving them insurance value,39 even if 
representation is never needed.40 
In the abstract, we can capture all of these benefits by figuring out how 
much value all Americans would place on the existence, size, and orienta-
tion of a low-income legal services program.  A slightly different means 
would be to ascertain the value of a program to all covered low-income 
 
 39. Legal insurance is sold in the market and is therefore a valuable product that, in 
theory, can be understood by people worried about legal incidents.  Cf. Teresa Lantigua Pe-
terson, Legal Insurance Catching on with Companies, TAMPA BAY BUS. J., Dec. 4, 1998, 
available at http://tampabay.bizjournals.com/tampabay/stories/1998/12/07/focus3.html? 
page=1 (“Many small business owners who need a lawyer but can’t afford one have another 
option: Legal insurance.  It works much like an HMO giving businesses access to a network 
of attorneys who agree to provide services for free or discounted rates in exchange for a 
steady stream of business.”). 
 40. Some of these benefits will turn on how many low-income individuals know about 
the legal services program.  If someone has no idea that free legal services are available to 
her, she can still benefit even if only a small number of individuals are aware because that 
small group may be enough to reduce, say, discrimination against all low-income individu-
als.  But, she will not benefit from ex post awards (adjusted for transfers), the freedom that 
comes with knowing certain rights are protected, or even from the insurance value provided.  
Thus, awareness of any program will dramatically change the benefits calculations. 
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Americans, although because we are not evaluating the entire population, 
we would have to discount the resulting transfers that might flow to low-
income individuals from other groups.41  Individuals will of course vary in 
how much they value legal services, but any valuation should include all of 
the ex ante and ex post benefits described above assuming that low-income 
individuals understand what the program will provide and can think care-
fully about their potential needs for legal assistance and the likely effects of 
the program on the behavior of others.  After all, an individual thinking 
carefully about receiving free health care would recognize that, with some 
probability, he or she might never need it, that it might be useless (say, for 
an incurable disease), or that it might be extremely valuable.42 
So how do we translate this abstract idea of figuring out how much low-
income individuals would value the public provision of legal services to 
something operational?  It turns out that this kind of problem is not new.43  
We see it in many other contexts.44  How do we value the benefits of a na-
tional park?  How do we determine how much someone values six months 
of pain-free life?  Researchers have worked out many different ways to get 
at the answers to these questions, but despite the extensive experience that 
policymakers have with cost-benefit analysis, for some reason, relatively 
 
 41. This would also exclude the direct and indirect benefits enjoyed by the rest of the 
population.  See infra Part V.  Direct benefits might include reduced crime, less blight, and a 
host of other social improvements directly experienced by all citizens (in different amounts).  
As for indirect benefits, many well-off Americans would derive benefit from knowing that 
low-income Americans have access to the justice system.  See Paul R. Portney, The Contin-
gent Valuation Debate, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4-5 (1994) (“[Passive use value] is the value 
that individuals may attach to the mere knowledge that rare and diverse species, unique nat-
ural environments, or other ‘goods’ exist, even if these individuals do not contemplate ever 
making active use of or benefiting in a more direct way from them.”).  Some research indi-
cates that four-fifths of Americans already believe that low-income individuals have a right 
to civil representation, see RHODE, supra note 6, at 4, which may mean that some are “bene-
fiting” from an access program that does not exist.  If true, then the marginal benefit of ex-
panding access would be lower than otherwise, were we to include these outsider benefits.  
In addition, if non-low-income individuals, on average, sustain costs as a consequence of 
such a program (and these are not accounted for elsewhere, for example, by treating the 
program’s tax-funded budget as a cost), these people should be included. 
 42. Numerous cognitive and behavioral biases likely interfere with people’s assessment 
of the value of health insurance.  For example, people are over-optimistic about their 
chances of avoiding disease.  See, e.g., Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Sus-
ceptibility to Health Problems, 5 J. BEHAV. MED. 441 (1982).  This bias might cause people 
to undervalue health insurance.  Optimism bias may also lead to the undervaluation of pub-
lic legal services. 
 43. For an early survey of cost-benefit analysis and the challenges its use poses, see 
A.R. Prest & R. Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 ECON. J. 683 (1965). 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 706-28 (discussing the application of cost-benefit analysis to water 
projects, transportation projects, land usage, health, and education). 
PRESCOTT_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:44 PM 
2010] CALCULATING ACCESS BENEFITS 319 
 
little effort has been devoted to measuring these sorts of benefits in the le-
gal services context. 
That is not to say nothing has been done.  Some progress has been made 
in trying to evaluate how many people are “in need” of legal services, and I 
describe some of that work in the next part of this essay.  But, the number 
of people “in need” is not an accurate assessment of the non-market bene-
fits that would be produced by expanding such programs.  As a conse-
quence, new methods and new attention must be directed toward the ques-
tion of how much value is produced from legal services programs. 
III.  PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO MEASURE THE VALUE OF EXPANDING 
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 
In this part, I review two attempts to evaluate the benefits that expanded 
civil legal services programs would provide.45  Both are prominent studies 
that try to assess the “need” for additional publicly provided legal services.  
By focusing on some rough measure of need, these reports necessarily rely 
on the “any benefit” approach I describe and criticize above.46  Specifical-
ly, “needs studies” investigate whether additional lawyers and funding 
would provide “any benefit at all” to low-income individuals.  This is ac-
complished by evaluating how many individuals appear to “need” access to 
lawyers and legal services, and how many are unable to locate or use such 
services at present.47  Crucially, these studies make almost no attempt to 
quantify the benefits of providing representation for common legal prob-
lems.48  We have no idea how much society would benefit from satisfying 
 
 45. ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9; LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3.  As noted 
above, there have been other attempts to quantify, or at least to think about quantifying, so-
ciety’s need for additional legal aid.  See Alpander & Kobritz, supra note 11, at 173-75 
(1978); Brownell, supra note 11, at 121-22; cf. Marks, supra note 11. 
 46. Although I do not systematically review the many state needs studies that have been 
conducted, I discuss two of the most prominent national studies, which generally incorpo-
rate the conclusions of, and use the same methods as, the state-level studies. 
 47. There are a number of questionable assumptions and methods used in these studies.  
I do not address these concerns here.  My goal is more general—to show that, from a poli-
cymaker’s perspective, the conclusions of these studies may not be particularly helpful even 
if they perfectly capture social “needs” for legal services. 
 48. I use the term “almost” because, on occasion, the studies try to assess whether the 
legal problems faced by low-income individuals are “important” or “extremely important.”  
LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3, at 11-12.  Presumably, receiving legal assistance for an 
“extremely important” legal problem will produce more benefit on average, but not in every 
situation.  If the client faces an “extremely important” legal difficulty with no “solution,” a 
lawyer might contribute less than when a client faces a less important, but solvable, prob-
lem.  We can safely say that when a low-income individual feels she needs legal services, 
the social benefits of providing them to her (leaving costs to one side) will be positive.  
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these needs or how to compare legal services needs to other needs for gov-
ernment services.  But, just as importantly, we also have no reason to think 
that these benefits are insignificant, as critics of legal services programs of-
ten suggest (on the basis of no systematic empirical scholarship).  Given 
the ferocity of the debate surrounding the social utility of legal aid pro-
grams, a workable empirical approach to estimating these benefits seems 
key to moving forward. 
Just to be clear, there are many strong arguments, unrelated to costs and 
benefits, for expanding access to the civil justice system.49  We might, for 
example, believe that rights ought to have remedies, and therefore agree 
that, costs and benefits aside, expanding access until all needs are satisfied 
is the just and, therefore, best policy.50  But, if our goal is to treat legal ser-
vices for low-income individuals as a government program, one that can 
only be expanded by reducing the size of other presumably valuable gov-
ernment programs (for example, programs providing different services to 
the same set of beneficiaries) or otherwise productive private sector activi-
ty, we must at least evaluate the problem using the currency of costs and 
benefits.  If we do indeed value other types of public benefits (e.g., gov-
ernment-provided health care or education), then existing work document-
ing “need” cannot make the case that legal services programs should be ex-
panded, at least not without more. 
* * * 
In June 2007, the Legal Services Corporation issued a revised report 
titled “Documenting the Justice Gap: The Current and Unmet Civil Legal 
Needs of Low-Income Americans” (“LSC Report”).51  The LSC Report, 
the most current study of its kind, uses three methodologies to study the ex-
tent of “need” for low-income legal services, and then relies on its results 
to argue for the expansion of public funding of legal services for low-
income individuals.  The report states that “[t]he research and analysis . . . 
reveal a very serious shortage of civil legal assistance—an urgent justice 
 
Those benefits may not justify the cost of a lawyer’s time or even the expense of traveling to 
see a lawyer, however. 
 49. See Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1974) (“[F]or many of our 
citizens, the availability of legal services has reaffirmed faith in our government of laws.”). 
 50. In fact, the “needs” studies definitely take this road, at least in part.  In the Preface of 
the 2007 version of LSC Report, Helaine M. Barnett, President of the Legal Services Corpo-
ration, wrote, “Our nation promises justice for all, not just for those who can afford to pay 
for it.  The ideal may never be fully realized, but America can come closer to it.  As Judge 
Learned Hand said, ‘If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: 
Thou shalt not ration justice.’”  LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3, at preface. 
 51. Id. at 1-19. 
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gap—in the United States.”52  Strong words, but proponents of increased 
legal services funding need more to make their argument.  They must also 
contend that closing this “urgent” gap will produce more net good than 
closing all the other gaps society faces. 
The LSC Report’s first method counts the “number of people currently 
seeking help from LSC-funded legal aid programs who [could not] be 
served due to insufficient program resources.”53  The report concludes: 
The Justice Gap Report documents that nationwide, for every person 
helped by LSC-funded programs, another is turned away.  Fifty percent of 
those actually seeking help are turned away for one primary reason: lack 
of resources.  If anything, this finding is an understatement.  Many who 
are eligible for help never seek it—they do not know they have a legal 
problem, do not know help is available, or do not know where to go for 
help.54 
While these facts are compelling, they provide less guidance to policy-
makers than we would like because they do not speak to a number of im-
portant questions.  The most important are the following two.55  Of those 
turned away, what net benefits, if any, would have been generated by their 
having received counsel?  And, in light of those net benefits and the net 
benefits available through other programs or in the private sector, does ex-
panding legal services availability make sense policy-wise? 
We can probably safely assume that individuals who were turned away 
would have benefited, at least in some small amount, from having seen a 
lawyer and, if appropriate, from having received legal assistance.  After all, 
the price of the service to someone who is qualified is close to zero.56  But 
looking at client benefits rather than net social benefits ignores many of the 
social costs of providing these services—the cost of hiring the lawyers and 
staff, office space and supplies, among others.  These resources could also 
supply low-income individuals with other benefits, perhaps health care, 
education, job training, or just cash.  If many legal needs are serious but un-
 
 52. Id. at 18. 
 53. Id. at 5. 
 54. Id. at preface. 
 55. There are others, including whether any of these turned-away individuals procured 
legal services elsewhere.  The report assumes not, because they were financially eligible to 
receive publicly provided legal services, but there is no way to know whether they found 
help with another organization, with a pro-bono lawyer, or through friends. 
 56. If physically getting to a legal services office or communicating with legal services 
lawyers is difficult, then the cost to clients might be significant.  Still, these were individuals 
who were turned away, so we can assume that they made the trip (or the phone call) be-
cause, in expectation, they believed they would be better off for having seen a lawyer. 
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likely to be affected by the participation of a lawyer, it may well be that the 
government, by expanding access, would be, in effect, throwing resources 
away.  Thus, the number of individuals turned away at current funding le-
vels cannot answer the “net” benefit question. 
The second method employed by the LSC Report is a meta-analysis of a 
number of state-level surveys that asked samples of low-income individuals 
whether they had experienced a situation involving a legal issue (by pre-
senting various scenarios to the respondents),57 whether the problem expe-
rienced was “important” to them,58 whether the respondent understood the 
legal aspects involved, and whether they had sought or received legal help.  
As one would expect, the report finds that low-income individuals regularly 
experience “important” situations involving legal issues, that many respon-
dents did not understand the legal aspects of their problem or did not know 
that legal aid was available, and that, as a consequence, a large majority of 
individuals did not seek (or if they did, did not receive) legal assistance.59 
Methodological concerns aside, these demonstrations of need are still 
not tethered to net benefits.  We have no idea if it makes sense, from socie-
ty’s perspective, to involve lawyers in these situations.60  In fact, if beha-
vior can reveal respondents’ preferences, the fact that many of these indi-
viduals did not seek help (or seek suggestions from others about where or 
how they might find help) suggests that at least some of the legal issues ex-
perienced were in fact minor (despite reports to the contrary) or were suc-
cessfully resolved by compromise or otherwise without government-
provided legal assistance.  Of course, many of the respondents would have 
benefited significantly from having received legal services, but we have no 
idea how many or by how much.  We also have no estimate of the expected 
 
 57. The surveys indicate that most legal problems suffered by low-income individuals 
fall into the following categories: housing-related (e.g., evictions), consumer-related (e.g., 
debt-collection), and family-related (e.g., divorce).  See LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3, at 
11 & n.12.  Employment, government benefits, and health care disputes are also common. 
 58. It is tough to interpret “important” here.  At least 90% of respondents with a prob-
lem described their situation as “important.”  See id. at 11. 
 59. Id. at 13-14.  Importantly, many respondents reported that legal assistance was not 
sought because it would not have made a difference in the outcome.  The LSC Report inti-
mates that these responses may indicate lack of sophistication on the part of low-income 
respondents.  True, but a plausible alternative is that legal services wound up being unneces-
sary.  Sometimes, the correct legal outcome is obvious, even without a lawyer’s help. 
 60. One “rough and ready” approach would be to contrast the provision of legal services 
and other legal resources in the U.S. to what is made available in other similarly situated 
countries.  Using this approach, Gillian Hadfield finds that U.S. investments in legal servic-
es are comparatively low.  See Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply?  A 
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129, 149 (2010). 
PRESCOTT_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:44 PM 
2010] CALCULATING ACCESS BENEFITS 323 
 
costs (in the same document, for comparison purposes) to provide for these 
needs.  Consequently, we cannot determine whether expanding civil legal 
services to serve the population documented in the report is a good idea, at 
least not if maximizing net benefits is a criterion of some value. 
The final method employed by the LSC Report is the least convincing.  
The authors count all legal services lawyers in the country and compare the 
number of legal services lawyers per low-income individual to the number 
of non-legal services lawyers per non-low-income individual.61  This exer-
cise demonstrates that, per capita, low-income individuals have many fewer 
lawyers at their disposal.  This exercise not only says nothing about net 
benefits, it has trouble saying anything about need.  Although it may be a 
safe assumption, the LSC Report itself gives us no reason to think that the 
sorts of problems low-income and non-low-income individuals face are 
similar in kind or number.  These populations almost certainly require sig-
nificantly different levels and types of legal resources.  This measure may 
in fact be an underestimate of potential net benefits if low-income individ-
uals need many more such resources.62 
In 1994, more than ten years before the LSC issued its report, the Amer-
ican Bar Association published “Legal Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey 
of Americans” (“ABA Report”).  The ABA Report relies on a survey me-
thodology similar to that used in the state-level studies analyzed in the LSC 
Report, and similarly seeks to determine the number of legal needs per 
household,63 the types of legal needs, and the responses of households to 
those needs. 
The results presented in the ABA Report are broadly similar to those 
found by the LSC, but the ABA Report’s analysis is stronger (although nar-
rower in focus), if for no other reason than its authors appear to understand 
that, as a category, legal “needs” may not be particularly useful to policy-
makers: “The term ‘legal need’ is used advisedly. . . . [P]eople sometimes 
find ways of dealing with circumstances they face without turning to a 
 
 61. LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3, at 15-19. 
 62. This number-of-lawyers measure may be a significant underestimate of potential net 
benefits of expansion if, at equal per capita numbers of lawyers, an additional lawyer di-
rected toward helping low-income individuals would produce more benefits than would 
another lawyer employed by the average citizen.  By using an incorrect measure, proponents 
of expanding services may be underselling their case. 
 63. Wisely, the ABA Report collects information from low-income and moderate-
income households.  By comparing the responses from these two groups (which show some 
differences, but not many) to various questions, we can explore whether lack of sophistica-
tion explains the failure of some low-income individuals to take advantage of publicly pro-
vided legal services.  See generally ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9, at 7-8. 
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lawyer, a mediator, or the courts.  These circumstances are still considered 
‘legal needs’ although there is no implication they must . . . be brought to 
the justice system.”64  One interpretation of this conclusion is that satisfy-
ing legal needs does not necessarily equate with increasing or maximizing 
social benefit.  In fact, if expanding legal services programs to satisfy all 
needs precludes providing other services, low-income individuals can be 
made substantially worse off. 
The ABA Report also presents a more detailed picture of why some low-
income individuals do not turn to publicly provided legal services.  Only 
16% of individuals explained that “cost concerns” were the main reasons 
for not turning to the civil justice system to resolve their problem, while 
20% determined that accessing the civil justice system “wouldn’t help.”65  
The first category suggests need, but the second category is harder to in-
terpret.  It may be that the respondents determined, correctly, that a lawyer 
or the court system would not improve their chances and that settlement of 
some sort (even concession) was most appropriate.  But even more reveal-
ing is that 10% did not seek out assistance because it was “not really a 
problem,” 8% because they “left the situation,” 7% because they “handled 
it on their own,” 6% because they “took other action,” 5% because the “sit-
uation resolved,” and 4% because it was “not a legal problem.”66  These 
numbers, without more context, suggest that for many individuals with a 
“legal need,” providing a lawyer or legal advice would have been marginal-
ly useful at best, and maybe even counterproductive.67 
The LSC and ABA Reports are about needs, not about benefits.  Both 
reports are quite explicit that they seek to identify those who are being un-
derserved by existing legal services programs.  If the underlying policy 
goal is to satisfy all civil legal needs, regardless of cost or benefit, then 
 
 64. Id. at 8. 
 65. Id. at 21.  For a discussion about the apparently limited role of “legal costs” or “in-
come” in explaining these unmet needs (and what it even means to say that a need is “un-
met”), see Herbert M. Kritzer, Examining the Real Demand for Legal Services, 37 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 255 (2010) and Herbert M. Kritzer, To Lawyer or Not to Lawyer: Is that the 
Question?, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 875 (2008) 
 66. ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9, at 21. 
 67. Importantly, these numbers provide us with no information about whether low-
income individuals declined to enter into certain legal relationships because they had no 
means to enforce or understand their agreements or positions.  Perhaps low-income individ-
uals had relatively few legal issues for which increased legal access would have been useful 
precisely because these individuals felt they had no recourse to the justice system in the first 
place.  If so, these needs estimates are much lower than they would otherwise be in a world 
where low-income individuals behaved as if they were able to enforce their legal rights. 
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perhaps these studies have gone far enough.68  But if they instead seek to 
justify expanding legal services funding at the cost of other programs and 
priorities, policymakers may require more.  It may be right that we should 
not skimp on providing equal access to the justice system for all citizens, 
but it must also be true that equalizing educational and health care oppor-
tunities matters.  If policymakers must engage in trade-offs, a description of 
needs is insufficient.  We must decide whose needs to satisfy. 
It is surprising that the LSC and ABA Reports, in studying need, make 
no effort to quantify the benefits legal service providers would have pro-
vided, even to those determined to be in need, had these organizations re-
ceived more funding, much less the benefits that might accrue to society 
generally from greater levels of investment.  In arguing for more support, 
the reports do implicitly suggest, however, that the ability to access public-
ly provided legal services would alter outcomes for at least these potential 
clients.  But an appropriate benefits measure, as should now be clear, 
would look to more than just changes in expected outcomes for newly cov-
ered clients—benefits would include those changed outcomes (adjusting 
for transfers), but also crucial ex ante consequences, and the indirect and 
direct effects on non-clients. 
The closest legal services organizations come to a more balanced mea-
surement approach are their assessments of service quality, which provid-
ers do explicitly value.69  In addition to detailed performance criteria to en-
sure high quality service,70 the LSC (and many other legal services 
institutions) have embarked on targeted programs to improve their quality 
marks.  As a goal, high quality service may be an improvement because it 
includes much more than just client outcomes—it is also about process and 
structure.71  But, while there is overlap between benefit creation and quality 
 
 68. But probably not, because need is still defined too narrowly.  Cf. supra note 67. 
 69. Helaine M. Barnett, Sherman J. Bellwood Memorial Lecture: Justice for All: Are We 
Fulfilling the Pledge?, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 403, 423 (2005) (“Our challenge is to determine 
how to actually define quality, how to measure quality, and what our role as a funder is in 
helping to promote and inspire LSC-funded programs to provide the highest quality legal 
services possible.”). 
 70. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., PERFORMANCE CRITERIA 1 (2007) (“LSC has statutory respon-
sibility to ensure the provision of economical and effective delivery of legal assistance by 
Legal Services programs to eligible persons in all parts of the country . . . .”); see also Legal 
Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1974). 
 71. Michael J. Saks & Alice R. Benedict, Evaluation and Quality of Assurance of Legal 
Services: Concepts and Research, 1 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 373, 377 (1977) (“In cost-benefit 
terms, a good outcome to a lawyer may conflict with a client’s goals such as reaching an 
outcome in a much shorter period of time, or with other costs to the client, in dollars, ener-
gy, or so on.  Therefore, multiple criteria to evaluate quality must be employed.”). 
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service in that both care about more than just client outcomes, they are 
clearly distinct.  An institution delivering high quality service may not be 
worth the candle, and a program with objectively bad service may still pro-
duce significant marginal net benefits for society.  Thus, in order to argue 
that expansion of legal services provision is allocationally efficient, a me-
thod for measuring the benefits (not quality), specifically those for which 
there is no market measure, is needed. 
IV.  ASSESSING THE CRITICISMS OF LEGAL SERVICES FUNDING 
As with the non-welfarist reasons offered to support expanding the pub-
lic funding of legal services, many arguments pushed by opponents grow 
out of distinct values and assumptions, not different empirical conclusions 
about the real-world costs and consequences of legal services.  I have noth-
ing to say about these sorts of arguments in this essay, other than that cost-
benefit analysis and the measurement issues it involves are irrelevant to the 
debate unless and until the parties agree that welfare economics is the ap-
propriate way to think about the use of limited government (and social) re-
sources. 
Still, welfarist critics of the public provision of legal services abound, 
some of whom have attacked the “need” concept using arguments that are 
similar in flavor to the ones I offer above.72  Most conclude, with no empir-
ical evidence—other than cataloguing a number of unexpected costs or 
negative consequences—that legal aid programs ought to be eliminated or 
dramatically reduced in size.  Making a move similar to the advocates of 
“need” measures, opponents appear to rely on something like a “needless” 
or “unnecessary” cost criterion.  Just because a program is wasteful or ge-
nerates unexpected costs, however, does not mean the program should be 
abandoned.  The total benefits of the program may outweigh its (necessary 
and unnecessary) costs.  Indeed, once the benefits of the program are tal-
lied, expansion may be the obvious conclusion. 
Moreover, in weighing the arguments of the opponents to funding, it is 
important to be precise about the target they attack.  Many “critics of legal 
 
 72. One argument is that “need” is defined endogenously—meaning, whether there is a 
legal need turns first and foremost on what we define as “legal.”  See, e.g., Kenneth F. 
Boehm & Peter T. Flaherty, Legal Disservices Corp., 74 POL’Y REV., Fall 1995, available at 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3563827.html (noting that the ABA’s 
needs study “appears defective” because it fails “to distinguish between ‘unmet’ and ‘unre-
cognized’ legal needs” and arguing later that: “It may be impossible to quantify legal needs 
in the first place. . . . [L]egal problems are whatever clever lawyers decide to bring forth.  
Actual needs can only be established by poor people themselves exercising free choice.”). 
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services” object to the implementation of a particular program or type of 
program, not to the idea of the public provision of legal services generally.  
For example, there is no end to the line of people who advocate abolishing 
the LSC.73  These detractors view the LSC as the worst sort of public bu-
reaucracy,74 involving wasteful and abusive spending,75 in part because it 
contracts with private organizations that it must oversee but which are 
largely above the law,76 and inappropriate political lobbying (more on this 
complaint below).  Despite the fact that recent financial crises suggest that 
these faults are not the exclusive province of public actors, these critics 
demand oversight and punishment for those who have abused the public 
trust—in the form of entirely defunding their organization. 
But, the truth of these accusations aside, malfeasance of this sort is an 
argument about the costs of one particular way of delivering legal services.  
We can imagine a reformed LSC, or some other more efficient way of deli-
vering legal services to the disadvantaged in the form of subsidized or free 
legal advice.  True, opponents might say, but reform has been tried and has 
failed—the LSC is incorrigible.  They might go further by suggesting that, 
by its very nature, the public provision of legal services will be excessively 
costly, on many levels.  But these arguments speak only to costs of the en-
terprise, just as some proponents of expanded funding speak only to bene-
fits.  The misapprehension in these attacks, then, is failing to recognize that 
even jaw-dropping, unbelievably nervy costs (e.g., limousine services) are 
acceptable if the resulting benefits overwhelm these costs.  Furthermore, if 
these net benefits exceed the net benefits that can be produced by other 
 
 73. Or at least significant reform.  See generally LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR (Doug-
las J. Besharov ed., 1990). 
 74. For a recent accounting of the LSC’s “fiscal practices, conflicts of interest and gen-
eral mismanagement,” see LEGAL SERVS. CORP., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, RE-
PORT ON CERTAIN FISCAL PRACTICES AT THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION (2006) and its 
accompanying letter to Congress. 
 75. See, e.g., Sam Dealey, Illegal Services on the Hill, WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 9, 1999, 
at 18; Posting of Brandon Arnold, A Disservice to the Poor, to Cato@Liberty, 
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2006/09/29/a-disservice-to-the-poor/ (Sept. 29, 2006, 15:51 
EST); Posting of Brandon Arnold, It Pays to Waste Money, to Cato@Liberty, 
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2007/02/02/it-pays-to-waste-money/ (Feb. 2, 2007, 10:31 
EST). 
 76. See, e.g., Kenneth F. Boehm & Peter T. Flaherty, Why Legal Services Corporation 
Must Be Abolished, BACKGROUNDER, Oct. 19, 1995, available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/legalissues/BG1057.cfm (“The Legal Services Corporation cannot be reformed be-
cause it was designed to avoid external controls. In effect, it takes public funds and trans-
forms them into private funds, immune from the safeguards that govern other federal spend-
ing.”); cf. Jeremy Redmon, Legal Clinic in Virginia Again Under Scrutiny; Service 
Suspected of Padding Clients, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at A1. 
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public projects,77 then legal services funding should be expanded—despite 
the supposed inevitable waste that will follow. 
My basic claims are that these determinations are empirical, that they 
cannot be made by argument or logic alone, and that neither side of the le-
gal services debate has sought to measure and compare both the costs and 
benefits involved in the public provision of legal services.  On this score, 
one could assert that critics of legal services programs fare worse in that 
they have made no systematic attempt to measure either costs or benefits.  
Proponents of legal services expansion have at least attempted to demon-
strate some benefit through their needs studies,78 although one might com-
plain that telling only one-half of the story is likely to mislead and is not 
clearly better than no information at all.  Either way, it remains unknown 
whether, if we care principally about net benefits produced by government 
programs, more or less funding is appropriate. 
The argument that the LSC and, by analogy, other legal services organi-
zations are wasteful and “unnecessarily costly” is not the sole argument 
made against government involvement with legal services to low-income 
individuals.  Opponents of the LSC also claim that legal aid uses tax-payer 
money to pursue an ideological agenda.79  Examples include lobbying in 
favor of or suing on behalf of “illegal immigrants,”80 “radical feminists,”81 
 
 77. This is an important caveat.  Many critics of existing arrangements argue that judi-
care, pro bono, ADR, non-legal support centers, or other solutions (when properly financed 
and not crowded out by fully staffed programs) would create more benefits and fewer costs 
than even an ideal LSC and other “staff attorney” solutions.  See, e.g., Boehm & Flaherty, 
supra note 72.  There may be merit in these reform ideas, and policymakers should consider 
options more drastic than just adjusting the funding for existing models. 
 78. Abel and Vignola catalogue and describe many “cost-benefit” studies that compare 
program costs to certain measurable benefits, Abel & Vignola, supra note 34, but invariably 
the measured benefits and costs are either underinclusive, overinclusive, or more often both.  
These studies also often fail to discount (or justify the decision not to discount) transfers be-
tween clients and non-clients and between different jurisdictions (e.g., studies that demon-
strate the “benefits” of legal aid programs bringing “federal funding into the state,” ignoring 
the opportunity costs of using the money in one state instead of another).  Id. at 2. 
 79. See, e.g., CATO INST., CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS (105TH CONGRESS), CHAPTER 
15: COSTLY AGENCIES, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb105-15.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2010) (“The LSC distributes tax dollars to local nonprofit organizations to fund free civ-
il legal assistance to those in poverty.  Unfortunately, all too often those tax dollars are in-
stead used to fund lobbying and other political advocacy activities.  That is an inappropriate 
use of taxpayer funds.  The $400 million LSC should be abolished.”); Phyllis Schlafly, Time 
to Abolish Legal Services Corporation, EAGLE FORUM, Jan. 29, 1997, 
http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1997/jan97/97-01-29.html. 
 80. See, e.g., Boehm & Flaherty, supra note 76; National Legal and Policy Center, Tax-
payer-Funded Group Sues Americans on Behalf of Aliens . . . Again, Nov. 14, 2009, 
http://archive.nlpc.org/view.asp?action=viewArticle&aid=62 (“LSC-funded lawyers are 
supposed to help the poor with day-to-day civil legal problems.  Instead, they often litigate, 
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and “racial preferences,”82 rather than solely servicing “the poor.”  The 
boldest version of this argument asserts that the LSC and other legal ser-
vices providers are politically and ideologically rotten to their cores and 
that no amount of reform can remove the taint.83  But, even if this argument 
were 100% true,84 opponents would still need to show (or at least assert) 
that the benefits created by legal aid to the hundreds of thousands of disad-
vantaged people by LSC-funded organizations does not compensate for the 
harm produced by the ideological agenda of legal aid organizations.85 
To be sure, legal aid opponents identify many potential costs that might 
otherwise go unrecognized in any cost-benefit study.  For example, com-
mentators have asserted that legal aid providers have unwittingly promoted 
welfare dependency, helped to destroy public housing, undermined “the 
family,” encouraged illegal immigration and racial preferences, and inap-
propriately helped “criminals.”86  To the extent that publicly provided legal 
 
agitate and lobby for left wing social and political causes, including the promotion of illegal 
immigration.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Carey Roberts, Legal Services Corporation Turns Its Back on Men, IFEMIN-
ISTS.COM, May 17, 2006, http://www.ifeminists.net/introduction/editorials/2006/0517roberts 
.html (“The LSC was created for a good purpose: to provide legal services so poor Ameri-
cans could have their day in court.  But while taxpayers and lawmakers looked the other 
way, the Legal Services Corporation has fallen under the sway of a radical gender ideolo-
gy.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Boehm & Flaherty, supra note 76, at text accompanying nn.64-65. 
 83. See, e.g., id. at text accompanying nn.3-10 (“Legal Services suffers from an institu-
tionalized ideological bias. . . . Legal services sees itself as a ‘movement’ . . . . According to 
its founders, its primary mission is not to meet the needs of individual poor people, but to 
achieve broader social change through ‘law reform.’”); cf. Maggie Gallagher, The New 
Serfs, NAT’L REV., Aug. 5, 1988, at 42 (“‘It’s too lawyer-dominated,’ agrees [Stephen] 
Elias.  ‘Lawyers like to do what interests them.  Routine legal work is boring.  It’s a lot 
more fun to do the kind of work that interests you intellectually, like law reform.’”). 
 84. Many critics have argued that, by behaving politically, the LSC has violated federal 
law.  See James T. Bennett & Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Poverty, Politics, and Jurisprudence: 
Illegalities at the Legal Services Corporation, POL’Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Washington 
D.C.), Feb. 26, 1985, available at http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=915.  The 
question whether government entities run amok is tangential to my arguments about costs 
and benefits.  I focus here on the consequences of their actions, not whether (or why) they 
are “violations.” 
 85. Of course, some believe that an agenda focused on law reform will generate more 
benefits, not more costs.  See, e.g., Gabe Kaimowitz,  The Legal Services Corporation Has 
Forgotten Its Mission: It’s Time It Got Back to Basics, 17 HUM. RTS. 41, 43 (1990) (“But 
the poor don’t need thousands of lawyers whose boy scout vision would limit legal assis-
tance to the equivalent of helping a little old lady across a crowded street—whether she 
wants such aid or not.  What the poor need are ideas and legal strategies that will stop traffic 
in legislatures as well as courts, so that the poor can move about freely on their own.”). 
 86. See Boehm, supra note 37; see also Boehm & Flaherty, supra note 76; Rael Jean 
Isaac, War on the Poor, NAT’L REV., May 15, 1995, at 32-44. 
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services are causally responsible for broader social changes, the costs and 
benefits of those alterations should not go ignored.  Too often, however, the 
costs become the exclusive focus of public funding opponents without a 
full accounting of the resulting improvements. 
Even more important, however, is how little thought is generally given 
to the decision to attribute these “systemic” costs to legal services programs 
as opposed to some other causally necessary feature of our legal system.  
Put more directly: why should we count these costs against the good gener-
ated by publicly funded legal service providers?  Legal aid lawyers do not 
act in a vacuum.  To bring change (good or bad) to the world, legal aid 
lawyers must use substantive and/or procedural rights afforded to their 
clients by some other source of governmental power (e.g., the Constitution, 
the common law, a statute, a regulation, etc.).87 
We can think of legal aid activities falling into two categories.  First, le-
gal aid lawyers help individuals pursue valid legal claims, and the pursuit 
or enforcement of these claims generates costs (and benefits), some of 
which were unexpected.  Consider, for example, lawsuits to enforce wel-
fare rights.  Opponents argue that these suits led to the greatly expanded 
use of benefits and the concomitant dominance of entitlement issues in all 
fiscal decisions.  Assuming these are valid claims, however, such use 
seems to have been the legislature’s hope.  Opponents also suggest that le-
gal aid has led to welfare dependency, which legislatures did not intend.  
Perhaps, but is legal aid lawyering the cause of welfare dependency?  Or is 
it the substantive structure of the welfare laws? 
To the extent that some “fully enforced” benefits are too “expensive,” 
that “fully enforced” substantive law entails unanticipated costs, or that 
“full enforcement” was unexpected, laws can be changed and regulations 
adjusted.88  Such transparency seems superior to an arrangement in which 
laws are premised on the inability of some (perhaps the least capable) to 
assert lawful claims effectively (including those that employ new, but 
 
 87. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 108-10. 
 88. A nice example here is the argument that legal services organizations raise the costs 
of evicting alleged drug criminals from public housing, thereby effectively “destroying” the 
housing by allowing drug crime to run rampant.  See Boehm & Flaherty, supra note 76, at 
text accompanying nn.40-43.  Assuming that the examples provided by opponents are repre-
sentative (and ignoring the fact that a general rule of providing representation against evic-
tion actions may have significant benefits and may lead to important behavioral changes 
(e.g., deterrence of abusive behavior by the public housing authorities)), these consequences 
are significant.  Nonetheless, the “destruction” of public housing is equally due to insuffi-
cient policing resources, the existence of the Fourth Amendment, and so on.  Opponents 
must make some additional assumption, at least, to lay these costs entirely at the feet of le-
gal services providers. 
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plausible interpretations of laws).  Nonetheless, opponents are right to sug-
gest that strong advocacy might have unexpected consequences, and that 
these consequences ought to be considered, even if ultimately credited 
against the substantive guarantees at issue. 
The second category of claims that generate knock-on “costs” are suits 
brought without merit (or the defense against suits with clear merit) simply 
to raise the costs of the other party and/or to “extort” changes in policy, de-
spite little or no legal basis.89  To the extent this happens, it ought to be 
viewed as a cost, as I recognized above when discussing the possibility of 
the filing of meritless claims.  The targets of meritless claims may react in 
inefficient ways to avoid future suits (e.g., converting a low-income apart-
ment building into condos).  The resulting costs in terms of resources and 
suboptimal behavioral changes may be substantial, although the evidence 
on this point, to date, appears anecdotal, turning solely on inferences drawn 
from examples.90 
Alone, of course, the mere existence of such costs tells us little about 
whether we ought to expand or reduce the public provision of legal servic-
es.  After all, we view the public support of the private law system as 
worthwhile, despite costly strategic behavior on the part of litigants and the 
regular filing of meritless and harassing litigation.  To know whether we 
come out the same way on legal services provision, we must attempt to 
measure (or at least bound) these costs.  We must also calculate the bene-
fits produced by these suits (or, assuming that all programs will involve 
some meritless litigation, all suits) and make comparisons.  These compari-
sons have not yet been made. 
Opponents of legal services appear to assume that legally weak cases or 
meritless cases are “zero” benefit cases.  Such an assumption may appear 
reasonable, but it would be just an assumption.91  The fact that a legal aid 
 
 89. See Frank, supra note 2, at 3 (“If a dispute over shelter entitles one to a free attorney 
on the government’s dime, it will be much easier for people to intentionally refuse to pay 
rent or fight evictions when they violate a lease in ways that threaten other tenants.  This 
will have costs far beyond simply paying for the plaintiff’s attorneys.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Howard Phillips & Peter Ferrara, Hidden Costs of the Legal Services 
Corp., WASH. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, at B4 (describing many cases that the authors view as 
meritless or counterproductive). 
 91. In the civil Gideon context (where a right to a lawyer in civil cases would presuma-
bly dramatically increase funding to civil legal services), Ted Frank has argued: “We can 
expect that the flood of meritless criminal defense appeals will be duplicated in the civil 
context if legal access is costless to both the client and the attorney.  A lot of big-firm pro 
bono work is self-serving or socially counterproductive.  There is little evidence that poor 
people with meritorious civil cases could not be served by the current legal system of legal 
aid societies and pro bono work by attorneys.”  Frank, supra note 2, at 2-3.  Frank goes on 
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lawyer pursues a meritless case to force a policy change does not mean that 
the resulting policy change is not socially preferable.  We may favor having 
experienced and insulated judges or democratically elected officials deter-
mine the contours of our substantive legal rights because we believe they 
are more likely to arrive at the correct answer or because their decisions 
have more legitimacy in the eyes of many.  But, in certain contexts at least, 
the source of the change might well be irrelevant—the only question of 
consequence may be whether the final bargain is a net improvement.92 
In fact, having policy advocates who seek “preventative” change and fo-
cus on the needs and hopes of the disadvantaged,93 a group that is poorly 
represented in electoral politics because its members have difficulty voting 
or are disenfranchised (e.g., ex-felons), may be a beneficial counterweight 
to the problems generated by other social or political arrangements.  Unfor-
tunately, the methods I explore in the next section are not well suited to 
capturing the more systemic benefits that may result from a law reform or 
class action-oriented legal aid agenda, as opposed to the more easily meas-
ured individual-level benefits low-income individuals derive from having 
access to a lawyer. 
V.  IMPROVING THE BENEFITS MEASURE? 
I began this essay by making the case that, from a welfare economics 
perspective, allocation decisions require the accurate measurement of the 
costs and benefits of government programs.  Then, in Part III, I argued that 
existing studies of legal services have focused, inappropriately, on various 
measures of “need.”  Some have suggested that providing legal access de-
serves special treatment in our allocation calculations, but if instead legal 
services ought to be viewed as government programs, funded only to the 
extent they provide net social benefits at competitive levels, the needs stu-
dies are insufficient to make the case.  Even if there is something special 
 
to detail a few cases that appear to be socially wasteful, but despite his claim that two or 
three examples prove that none of the cases cited is an “outlier,” it makes little sense to eva-
luate the overall attractiveness of a program or policy only on the basis of its mistakes or 
poor showings. 
 92. The beneficial consequences may be many even if the claim is meritless.  The mere 
fact that low-income individuals have a group of publicly funded lawyers working zealously 
on their behalf may lead to a view that the system is more fair and legitimate, which in turn 
could lead to reduced crime, increased cooperation with the police, neighborhood invest-
ment, etc. 
 93. For a discussion of the historical evolution of this approach to legal aid, see Michael 
Givel, Legal Aid to the Poor: What the National Delivery System Has and Has Not Been 
Doing, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 369, 370 (1998). 
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about ensuring access, understanding the sacrifices we make by foregoing a 
welfarist arrangement will give us greater insight into the specifics and 
strength of our social priorities. 
Either way, we need some means of estimating the non-monetary bene-
fits produced by government services.  Researchers employing cost-benefit 
analysis have developed a number of methods to measure such payoffs, us-
ing pilot programs, market data, or surveys, for example.94  Below, I briefly 
mention a few of these approaches, but I describe in more detail a survey-
based technique—the contingent valuation (“CV”) method—that can be 
used to measure the benefits of services that are rarely traded in markets.95 
Importantly, I discuss contingent valuation not because CV is ideal, but 
because its application in the legal services context would require the least 
change to the needs-oriented survey approaches that are currently being 
used by researchers studying the benefits of legal services.  In fact, CV suf-
fers from numerous and well-documented biases and other drawbacks, 
some of which I will mention, but many of which I will not discuss.96  
Moreover, other valuation methods may be superior in the particular con-
text of legal services provision.  Nevertheless, because these other methods 
would require either significant outlays of resources or would rest on sig-
nificant assumptions themselves, I opt to start small.97 
But, before turning to how a researcher goes about implementing CV, it 
makes sense to return yet again to what we are trying to measure.  At base, 
we want to know how much a prospective recipient would value the service 
he might receive if the program were authorized or expanded—not whether 
he “needs” it, but how much he would benefit from it.98 
 
 94. See, e.g., Abel & Vignola, supra note 34 (discussing a number of pilot programs and 
explaining how they are used to study the consequences of certain legal aid approaches). 
 95. See generally Trudy Ann Cameron, Contingent Valuation, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 96. For the most comprehensive discussion of the weaknesses of contingent valuation, 
although the work is now slightly dated, see CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESS-
MENT (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993). 
 97. I do not mean to undersell CV generally.  There is obviously significant precedent 
for its use in evaluating all sorts of government programs.  See, e.g., Colette M. Escobar, W. 
Steven Barnett & John E. Kieth, A Contingent Valuation Approach to Measuring the Bene-
fits of Preschool Education, 10 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 13 (1988); Bernie J. 
O’Brien et al., Assessing the Value of a New Pharmaceutical: A Feasibility Study of Contin-
gent Valuation in Managed Care, 36 MED. CARE 370 (1998). 
 98. Cost-benefit analysis focuses on making these measurements ex ante, i.e., at the time 
the decision to establish or expand the program is made, not after individuals receive bene-
fits under the program.  See Trumbull, supra note 22, at 205-06. 
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The touchstone concept here, drawn from economics (and also not un-
controversial), is termed willingness-to-pay (“WTP”), typically defined as 
the maximum monetary amount a person would be willing to pay to receive 
a good or service.99  If we can calculate WTP for each incremental person 
affected by the program (participants and those who benefit as non-
participants), then we can just add up those individual amounts,100 and sub-
tract the marginal expenses of providing the service (assuming budgetary 
costs are fair measures of opportunity costs), and we have a rough and 
ready estimate.101 
For goods or services traded in a well-working market, we can estimate 
WTP by combining the equilibrium price and quantity for a service with at 
least one other piece of information (for example, a previously estimated 
demand elasticity or additional equilibrium information) to identify a de-
mand curve for the service directly.102  The area under the demand curve 
for the newly served individuals is a measure of consumers’ or beneficia-
ries’ WTP (measured in dollars).103 
We do see legal services trading hands in the market, even for low-
income individuals.  Therefore, we could attempt to use a “market analogy 
method” to attribute a WTP to low-income individuals.104  But, we must be 
aware that potential recipients may have preferences that are distinct from 
the general population, and that the services supplied by a legal aid pro-
gram almost certainly differ from those supplied by the market.105  In other 
 
 99. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 76.  Willingness-to-accept (“WTA”) is an 
attractive alternative concept.  I define it and discuss its potential application in the CV con-
text below, where the choice between WTP and WTA in the design of a survey instrument 
is likely to make a difference in the estimates that result. 
 100. There are important theoretical limitations to “adding up” individual WTP values to 
arrive at a social WTP.  See id., at 33-35.  In addition, we might also consider including the 
benefits of monetary transfers (i.e., damages), depending on whether the WTP measure in-
cludes the prospect of receiving a damages award. 
 101. This is a very rough description.  There are many technical and theoretical concerns 
and methodological difficulties raised by cost benefit analysis, the WTP measure, and the 
CV methodology used to calculate it.  For example, CV and WTP ideas assume away “un-
certain” preferences.  See G. Cornelis van Kooten, Emina Krcmar & Erwin H. Bulte, Prefe-
rence Uncertainty in Non-Market Valuation: A Fuzzy Approach, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 
487 (2001). 
 102. For examples, see BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 314-29. 
 103. See id. at 51-69; GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 48-59. 
 104. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 338-40. 
 105. In order for the market analogy method to work, we must be looking at roughly the 
same good or service.  Even if we conclude that we are looking at the same service (same 
type, same quality), “[u]sing the market price would be an appropriate estimate of the value 
of the publicly provided good [only] if it equals the average amount that users of the public-
ly provided good would be willing to pay.”  Id. at 338. 
PRESCOTT_CHRISTENSEN 3/12/2010  1:44 PM 
2010] CALCULATING ACCESS BENEFITS 335 
 
words, there is no uniform product called “civil legal access,” although 
there are insurance programs that could provide a baseline for the valuation 
of these services. 
Alternatively, we might try to estimate WTP using a “trade-off method,” 
in which we calculate a person’s WTP by what that person is willing to sa-
crifice to receive the service in question.106  How far will they drive?  How 
long will they wait?  If we assume that new beneficiaries of legal services 
programs would be similar to existing clients (or some subset of existing 
clients), we may be able to draw conclusions about the benefits that will 
emerge from expanded access.  The difficulty with this method is that we 
must also price what these individuals are willing to sacrifice to access the 
civil justice system.  Unfortunately, many low-income individuals do not 
work and are, in general, budget constrained in their behavior.  These are 
just limitations—time is always valuable—but they may make it signifi-
cantly more difficult to calculate the appropriate number. 
CV methods are not obviously better than using a “market analogy me-
thod” or a “trade-off method” to estimate benefits, but CV is similar in 
style to the surveys now being used in needs studies throughout the U.S.  
Instead of asking low-income individuals whether they have experienced a 
particular need, whether that need was important or very important, and 
how that need was resolved,107 one could instead design a survey to quanti-
fy, directly, a recipient’s or, even better, a potential recipient’s, willingness-
to-pay for access to particular legal services. 
But, before sketching the various ways a researcher might go about im-
plementing a contingent valuation study of the benefits of expanding legal 
access, we need to answer a preliminary, but crucial, question: because, in 
theory, legal services can be sold in a market to low-income individuals, 
does the fact that we do not see very many such services provided by the 
market necessarily indicate that the net social benefits of the government 
providing these services must be negative?  The answer is “no,” for a few 
distinct reasons. 
First, private providers care primarily about profit, not about social bene-
fit.  A lawyer’s profit does not include any consumer surplus, i.e., that ben-
efit that cannot be collected through the price demanded.  Assuming that 
private lawyers cannot first-degree price discriminate (and thereby capture 
all consumer surplus) and that low-income individuals differ significantly 
 
 106. See id. at 340. 
 107. Recall that questions of these types were included in the 1994 ABA Report.  See 
generally ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9. 
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in their valuation of legal services,108 the fact that providing legal services 
to low-income populations is not profitable, even in a well-functioning 
market, tells us something, but not everything, about the net social benefits 
provided by a potential program. 
Second, although low-income individuals might value additional legal 
services at a level above their marginal social cost, there may be market 
failures that are particularly acute in the low-income segment of the legal 
services market.  For example, low-income individuals may not have suffi-
cient funds available to pay for the services they value when those services 
are actually needed, and they may have limited access to financial mar-
kets.109  Additionally, if low-income individuals are relatively unsophisti-
cated consumers of legal services, asymmetric information about the quali-
ty of services received or the amount of effort expended by a lawyer may 
lead these individuals to forego paying for these (potentially less regulated, 
private) services for fear of getting nothing and, in that case, having no ob-
vious recourse.110  Finally, access to legal services may be a public good in 
that at least some of the benefits come in the form of ex ante changes in 
behavior by potential defendants (deterrence), changes which may benefit 
many more people than just the client or clients bringing suit.111 
Third, a legal services program may exist in part to accomplish redistri-
butional aims.112  We could incorporate a social planner’s preference for a 
 
 108. First-degree price discrimination occurs when a seller of a good can determine pre-
cisely how much a consumer is willing to pay for a good or service.  If the seller has that 
information, which is never the case for all consumers in the real world, he can capture the 
entire social surplus by setting the price to equal the consumer’s WTP.  JEAN TIROLE, THE 
THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 135-37 (1988). 
 109. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 10.  In other words, low-income individuals may often 
be liquidity constrained.  At the time of their need for advice or representation, they may not 
have sufficient savings and may have no ability or time to borrow from a bank or other 
source of capital, like friends or family members. 
 110. Lawyers, like doctors, are difficult for clients to monitor effectively, especially if the 
client has no background in law or no previous experience with the legal issue in question.  
See, e.g., Jack Oceano, Four Ways Lawyers Cheat Their Clients, ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 
18, 2007 (citing overbilling, hidden fees, poor advice, etc.). 
 111. See RHODE, supra note 6, at 11.  The fact that legal services can be public goods ap-
pears, at first blush, to raise difficulties for CV methods, at least if we were to ask a poten-
tial client how much he would value his having access to a lawyer, because the potential 
client would not take into account the benefits created for others.  The question can be re-
framed, however, to inquire about how much value the potential client would place on the 
existence of a program that would help him and similarly situated individuals with their le-
gal problems.  This form of the question would allow him to account for the benefits he 
might receive from his own use of the services as well as from some other individual’s ef-
forts that, through no effort on his part, provide the potential client with benefits. 
 112. Cf. GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 22-25. 
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more equal distribution of social resources by conceiving of benefits as in-
cluding a redistributional premium in addition to the recipient’s benefit 
(and the benefits of affected nonparticipants).113  Alternatively, we could 
employ a social multiplier of some sort—benefits by low-income individu-
als would be multiplied by some number greater than one when compared 
to benefits received by other citizens.114  Either way, a well-working mar-
ket would not produce the optimal outcome, given these social preferences.  
As a result, it should not be surprising that private legal services providers 
might offer too few services (from society’s perspective) or perhaps none at 
all. 
Together, these arguments suggest that we may see the underprovision 
of legal services to low-income individuals for the same or similar reasons 
we see the underprovision of parks or other public goods by private ac-
tors—market failures can create disconnects between privately optimal be-
havior and socially optimal arrangements.  We may, of course, be able to 
fix the failures leading to underprovision of legal services by progressive 
taxation, providing information and education, or regulating lawyers serv-
ing low-income populations.  These ideas are beyond the scope of this es-
say.  Instead, I take it as a given that the benefits created by legal services 
programs may be substantial, despite the market failing to make them 
available at a price low-income individuals can afford. 
* * * 
A contingent valuation study begins with the identification of a survey 
population.115  Are we interested solely in how much low-income individu-
als value legal services?  Possibly, but there are plenty of reasons to think 
people in general place value on all citizens having access to the legal sys-
tem.116  In fact, because some view legal access as a right, many who will 
never qualify to receive legal aid still support its expansion on a rights basis 
alone.117  Separately, the indirect effects of providing legal services to low-
 
 113. See id. at 22-25, 229; Adler & Posner, Implementing CBA, supra note 20, at 1135-
41. 
 114. See GRAMLICH, supra note 14, at 115-31. 
 115. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 370. 
 116. Of course, all individuals are potential legal aid clients—the well-off do fall on hard 
times.  Higher-income respondents should consider this possibility in valuing the program. 
 117. Measuring these passive benefits will be a difficult (and questionable) aspect of any 
CV study.  See generally Daniel McFadden, Contingent Valuation and Social Choice, 76 
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 689 (1994).  Consequently, it might make practical sense just to as-
sume these benefits are zero, or otherwise account for their possibility ex post, especially in 
light of the fact that many Americans already incorrectly believe that low-income Ameri-
cans have full access to lawyers.  See RHODE, supra note 6, at 4.  For some of the criticisms 
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income individuals might generate direct benefits (and costs) for non-
participants if improved legal access has important social consequences—
e.g., reduced crime, a more effective workforce, etc.118  These complexities 
suggest that a researcher should consider sampling two populations—those 
who would qualify as clients, and those who are likely only to appreciate 
the existence of the program or benefit through social change.119  Sampling 
both groups would be expensive, but important,120 given how differently 
these populations may value more robust legal aid programs. 
Next, any CV survey would need to settle on a specific policy proposal 
and determine how to describe or present this proposal to survey respon-
dents.121  It is important that respondents put a value on the actual proposal 
(or a part of the proposal) and the opportunities and benefits it provides to 
them, and not on some other plausible set of services.  Moreover, the pre-
cise framing of the questions turns out to be critical to arriving at reliable 
estimates. 
With respect to describing the policy, we could opt for one all-
encompassing definition that characterizes the program in the abstract: “A 
program that provides legal advice and representation to low-income indi-
viduals when they face civil legal problems.”  The difficulty with this ap-
proach is that a vague description may not convey enough information 
about what the program entails for respondents to answer accurately.  We 
would have little reason to believe that respondents were valuing the same 
 
of using CV to measure existence value, see generally Peter A. Diamond & Jerry A. Haus-
man, On Contingent Valuation Measurement of Nonuse Values, in CONTINGENT VALUA-
TION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993). 
 118. For an example of this possibility, see THE PERRYMAN GROUP, THE IMPACT OF LE-
GAL AID SERVICES ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN TEXAS: AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT EFFORTS 
AND EXPANSION POTENTIAL (2009) (arguing that legal aid more than pays for itself by stimu-
lating business activity, which presumably benefits more than just low-income citizens). 
 119. Legal services lawyers may constitute a third (overlapping) population receiving 
benefits from expanding legal aid.  Here, benefits do not come in the form of receiving a 
salary.  Salaries are an opportunity cost.  Rather, public interest lawyers may reap some ad-
ditional emotional payoff from working for low-income individuals.  Such rents, were they 
to occur in a well-working labor market, would presumably generate a queue for legal aid 
jobs, which would in turn lead to salary reductions until the marginal legal services lawyer 
was just indifferent to other opportunities.  If the marginal and average lawyer were similar, 
then these benefits would be, in effect, already included in the final tally as lower salary 
costs. 
 120. Recall that the ABA Report surveyed both low-income and moderate-income indi-
viduals, providing a precedent for a survey-based study that does not focus exclusively on 
low-income potential clients.  See ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9, at foreword. 
 121. See Portney, supra note 41, at 5-6. 
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thing, much less the right thing,122 although, on average, they may get it 
about right.  More problematic, as the ABA and LSC Reports make plain, 
is that many low-income individuals may not understand when they have 
legal needs or what legal rights they may have when faced with a legal is-
sue.  Therefore, an abstract description would probably lead to an underes-
timate (or at least an inaccurate appraisal) of a program’s benefits. 
Instead, we might ask individuals to value distinct sets of services, per-
haps by describing problems regularly faced by low-income individuals 
and by explaining how legal services might help resolve those problems.123  
Not only might this approach lead to a more accurate assessment of a gen-
eral legal services program by providing respondents with more context 
and information about the specific services available, but it would also al-
low us to evaluate the value of expanding the provision of legal services in 
particular substantive areas.  Because legal services typically fall into a 
number of discrete categories (e.g., landlord/tenant, employment, etc.), we 
could frame questions to deal with particular concerns, or even present 
common factual scenarios (e.g., wrongful eviction).124  Yet another set of 
questions could highlight the difference between receiving advice or repre-
sentation in transactional settings relative to adversarial settings. 
To be worth their salt, CV studies must also be neutral in their framing 
of issues.  It is one thing to stress benefits to an individual who will subse-
quently be asked to pay for the service or product he evaluates—we might 
be able to rely on that individual to scrutinize closely all claims and tra-
deoffs before making any transaction.  But framing and full information are 
crucial when using a hypothetical survey.125  By failing to provide the full 
picture, poorly designed CV studies can generate unreliable results.126 
 
 122. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 379-80; see also Henrik Svedsater, Eco-
nomic Valuation of the Environment: How Citizens Make Sense of Contingent Valuation 
Questions, 79 LAND ECON. 122 (2003). 
 123. In carrying out a CV study, we could ask each respondent many different questions 
in many different ways about many different, but very related, services.  There is a concern, 
however, that the order in which the questions are asked and previously given answers will 
influence the answers respondents provide.  See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 385.  
Randomizing the question order for each interview might help, but an ideal study would ex-
pand the set of interviewees and essentially conduct a separate study on each proposed ser-
vice or service feature. 
 124. Again, previous work demonstrates that taking this approach is feasible: existing 
needs studies often ask respondents about their experience with dozens of common legal 
issues.  See ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9 (describing the sixty-seven scenarios pre-
sented to each respondent). 
 125. See Portney, supra note 41, at 9. 
 126. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 380-82. 
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Consequently, any CV study of expanded legal services provision 
should be conducted by disinterested researchers.  To ensure neutrality, it 
would be important to stress the personal (if not financial) costs to each 
prospective client of taking advantage of these services, as well as the ben-
efits of resolving legal problems without the use of lawyers or courts.  Re-
searchers should also stress the negative consequences that may follow 
from resorting to the use of legal services (other than some possibility of 
losing a dispute or remaining in the status quo), such as loss of reputation 
and the practical (if illegal) possibility of retaliation.  The same neutrality 
of presentation would also be indispensable in any survey directed toward 
individuals unlikely to use publicly provided legal services directly. 
Researchers interested in using CV methods to study expanding legal 
services programs would also have to decide whether to frame the program 
as providing people with a remedy for their “rights” (using a willingness-
to-accept approach) or instead as providing low-income individuals with an 
expanded government “benefit” (using a willingness-to-pay approach).127  
For most yet-to-be-granted government services, WTP seems to be the ap-
propriate measure—there is no sense in which individuals can claim to 
“own” a benefit not yet in existence.  But with legal services programs, one 
could persuasively argue that low-income individuals have rights to make 
use of law and courts,128 and therefore the value of interest is how much a 
person would accept to give up those rights by agreeing to limit or elimi-
nate publicly provided access. 
Fortunately, by rephrasing a survey’s questions, researchers can measure 
WTA instead of WTP, but this decision should not be taken lightly—these 
two approaches will likely produce different outcomes.  WTP estimates of 
value are often lower than WTA estimates of value,129 which would render 
 
 127. Instead of inquiring how much the respondent would offer to “buy” a good or ser-
vice, WTA surveys assume the respondent already “owns” or “controls” the service and is 
instead being asked how much he would accept to part with it.  See id. at 387-88.  There is 
evidence that WTP and WTA estimates tend to converge with experience, but because a CV 
study would ask a respondent to make an evaluation just once, experience is no solution 
here.  See id. at 387 (citing sources).  For an example of the trade-offs (and empirical chal-
lenges) of using WTA, see Bishwanath Goldar & Smita Misra, Valuation of Environmental 
Goods: Correcting for Bias in Contingent Valuation Studies Based on Willingness-to-Pay, 
83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 150 (2001). 
 128. LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3, at preface. 
 129. One explanation of this disparity is that individuals may be loss averse, and so may 
value goods and services they already own more than goods and services they can buy.  See 
BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 383; Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Wil-
lingness To Pay vs. Willingness To Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 59, 88 (1993). 
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them more conservative in a sense and likely to favor the status quo.130  On 
the other hand, even where WTA estimates seem on their face to be more 
appropriate, WTP estimates typically line up much better with estimates 
produced by other methods.131 
Whether either survey approach is accurate, however, is a different 
question, turning on how the survey deals with the potential for strategic 
dishonesty on the part of respondents and the potential judgment biases that 
may influence the answers respondents provide.  The primary challenge 
CV methods are designed to tackle is strategic dishonesty and I discuss 
CV’s potential solutions to that concern below when I describe its tech-
niques.  But judgment biases may be just as much of a hazard to accurate 
assessment, and so it is critical for any researcher to keep them in mind.  
For example, over-optimism bias (which would tend to reduce measured 
WTP) may be particularly problematic in a survey asking how much some-
one would value legal advice in the (incorrectly assumed to be very unlike-
ly) case of a divorce, an arrest, or an eviction. 
More generally, as in virtually every other decision-making setting, cog-
nitive biases may skew respondent survey answers.  Many of the standard 
biases are present—including (in addition to over-optimism bias) availa-
bility bias, conjunction bias, anchoring bias, status quo bias, embedding bi-
as, and probability bias.132  In the CV context, however, the threat of cogni-
tive biases infecting estimates is even graver than elsewhere.  Researchers 
have demonstrated that the ordering of questions in the survey (ordering or 
sequencing bias) and the selection of the starting value (starting point bias) 
may also contort respondent reactions.133 
 
 130. The higher WTA measure may be more appropriate in public goods settings because 
WTP may be downward biased.  WTP is a function of income, and income-generating effort 
may be suboptimal when additional effort does not allow for the purchase of more of the 
public good.  See PHILIP E. GRAVES, THE SIMPLE ANALYTICS OF THE WTA-WTP DISPARITY 
FOR PUBLIC GOODS (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1365510. 
 131. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 380-82. 
 132. See e.g., id. at 379-94; RAYMOND J. KOPP, WERNER W. POMMEREHNE & NORBERT 
SCHWARZ, DETERMINING THE VALUE OF NON-MARKETED GOODS: ECONOMIC, PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL, AND POLICY RELEVANT ASPECTS OF CONTINGENT VALUATION METHODS (1997); Peter 
A. Diamond & Jerry A. Hausman, Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No 
Number?, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 45 (1994). 
 133. See John K. Horowitz, A New Model of Contingent Valuation, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 1268, 1268 (1993).  In dichotomous choice CV surveys, people also seem to answer 
“yes” too often, but as with other biases, researchers have developed various tools to deal 
with this concern as well.  See R.K. Blamey, J.W. Bennett & M.D. Morrison, Yea—Saying 
in Contingent Valuation Surveys, 75 LAND ECON. 126, 126 (1999). 
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As a result, a survey designer would need to devote significant energy to 
constructing the survey so as to reduce or eliminate the influence of these 
systematic errors.  Evidence suggests that these biases can be mitigated or 
at least measured,134 and some of these concerns seem likely to be less of a 
problem in the legal services context.  For example, biases are often more 
serious when individuals are asked to value very low probability events 
with extreme consequences.135  But the needs studies indicate that low-
income individuals regularly encounter legal problems and that these legal 
problems fall into a fairly standard set of categories.136  If true, individuals 
will not struggle to imagine these events.  In fact, they may already have 
had (or know people who have had) intimate experience with the legal is-
sue in question. 
Once a population has been selected and framing issues have been re-
solved, a researcher must choose a contingent valuation method.  There are 
a number of such methods from which to choose,137 and I will not explore 
them in detail.  At base, each method uses survey questions to learn about 
how much an individual would be willing to pay for something—in this 
case, access to legal services.  The single most difficult hurdle in contin-
gent valuation is to ensure that individuals report their valuation knowingly 
and honestly.  This core worry about dishonesty stems from the survey con-
text.  If you ask a low-income individual (who pays very low or no taxes) 
how much he would value a larger “free” legal services program, he has the 
incentive to overreport the benefit he expects to receive if he believes his 
answer might affect the policymaker’s decision.138 
There are two major categories of contingent valuation studies.  The first 
type, often referred to as direct elicitation, includes open-ended WTP me-
thods, closed-ended iterative methods, and contingent ranking methods.  
Open-ended approaches, which essentially ask an individual how much she 
would be willing to pay for a particular service or good, are less common 
because they are viewed, understandably, as less reliable than most alterna-
 
 134. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 379-94. 
 135. See id. at 382; see also K.S. Shrader-Frechette, Economics, Risk-Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, and the Linearity Assumption, 1 PROC. BIENNIAL MEETINGS PHIL. OF SCI. ASS’N 217, 
218-23 (1982). 
 136. ABA, LEGAL NEEDS, supra note 9; LSC, JUSTICE GAP, supra note 3. 
 137. For an article comparing some of the different methods, see Kevin J. Boyle & Ri-
chard C. Bishop, Welfare Measurements Using Contingent Valuation: A Comparison of 
Techniques, 70 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 20, 20-22 (1988). 
 138. To some extent, this concern is mitigated by including a payment vehicle (how the 
individual will “pay” for the hypothetical benefit) in the survey, which I discuss below.  See 
also BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 374, 388-91. 
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tives.  Closed-end iterative approaches start with a value and move away 
from it, depending on whether the respondent would or would not have 
paid the initial proposed amount.  Finally, contingent ranking methods ask 
respondents to rank various packages (price and quality/quantity); the re-
sulting ordinal ranking can be used to generate WTP estimates for incre-
ments of quality/quantity improvement.139 
In a closed-end iterative survey, for example, one could imagine asking 
someone whether he or she would pay $100 to have access to a free lawyer 
in case the individual needs to obtain a divorce at any point in the future.140  
If the answer is yes, then the interviewer might raise the amount to $125 
and check with the respondent again.  If the answer is no, the interviewer 
might suggest $75.  The interviewer can record the point at which each res-
pondent switches from yes to no or from no to yes, and then aggregate this 
information into a market demand curve, from which WTP can be de-
rived.141  In theory, this approach should capture all of the benefits the res-
pondent might obtain from having that lawyer available that I described in 
Part II—not just the benefit of getting a divorce conditional on needing a 
divorce, but also the value, if any, to the respondent now, of feeling more 
comfortable entering into marriage in the first place.  These indirect bene-
fits—the value that comes from being able to take advantage of the law ex 
ante, knowing that you have access to a lawyer should the need arise—may 
be substantial. 
The next group of CV approaches employs a dichotomous choice me-
thod.  In these studies, there is neither iteration nor the use of multiple pric-
es.  Instead, for each policy, the respondent is asked a single take-it-or-
leave-it question: Would you pay $X for policy Y?  The trick is that the re-
searcher will randomly select (within a reasonable range) a price $X for 
each respondent.  As long as we survey enough individuals, we can com-
bine the answers to generate an aggregate demand curve indicating how 
 
 139. See id. at 370-74 (briefly describing all of the above approaches and providing ex-
amples of such studies in the end notes). 
 140. A reader might react that we know individuals systematically underestimate their 
own likelihood of divorce.  As noted in my discussion of judgment biases above, over-
optimism can be a significant problem for CV studies.  Even if we are unable to remedy this 
concern through survey design, however, we can still profitably use any results to establish a 
lower bound of the benefits of expanding legal services.  If the marginal benefit of expand-
ing the program using this lower bound value exceeds the marginal costs by more than al-
ternative uses, then expansion would be warranted under a welfarist approach. 
 141. See, e.g., David Brookshire, Berry Ives & William D. Schulze, The Valuation of 
Aesthetic Preference, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 325, 325-26 (1976). 
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many respondents would buy (be “willing to pay”) for each price in a range 
of prices considered plausible.142 
Regardless of the precise structure of the survey, the use of a payment 
vehicle in the survey design is usually helpful, if not necessary, to make 
sure that the costs and benefits of the choice are made salient to the respon-
dent and to avoid encouraging respondents to behave in a strategically dis-
honest way.  The concern is that respondents might assume that reporting a 
very high WTP will increase the likelihood of receiving new or additional 
legal services (a benefit), but they will either not contemplate the costs or 
will assume the costs will be borne by other (higher-income) citizens.  
Consequently, researchers should not simply ask “how much one would be 
willing to pay” in the abstract, but should describe the specific method that 
would be used to collect the amount of money the respondent names (e.g., 
higher taxes, greater user fees, etc.).143 
One helpful payment vehicle to consider when evaluating a policy that 
targets low-income, budget-constrained individuals may be the reduction of 
other types of existing public benefits, given that many of the relevant res-
pondents may lack the income to pay an appropriate deductible and may 
pay no taxes.  For example, an interviewer might ask whether the respon-
dent would be willing to receive fewer food stamps or less housing assis-
tance in exchange for the availability of legal services.144  One nice aspect 
of this approach is that it measures the benefits of expanded legal services 
in non-monetary terms (i.e., in terms of reducing other publicly provided 
goods and services that may be linked to important values), which helps 
makes the ultimately inherent trade-offs involved more explicit. 
* * * 
 The sketch of CV methods above is very brief,145 but provides a flavor 
for how these methods might be used to gauge the benefits provided to par-
ticipants and nonparticipants alike by (more extensive) publicly provided 
 
 142. See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 371-74. 
 143. See id. at 374. 
 144. Cf. Robert J. Johnston, Stephen K. Swallow & Thomas F. Weaver, Estimating Wil-
lingness to Pay and Resource Tradeoffs with Different Payment Mechanisms: An Evaluation 
of a Funding Guarantee for Watershed Management, 38 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 97, 97-
98, 113-14 (1999). 
 145. There are a number of other issues a researcher would have to consider that I do not 
discuss.  For example, costs and benefits do not just occur in the present—the shape of fu-
ture streams of costs and benefits, which may differ from the streams of other projects and 
from each other, have to be taken into account and discounted appropriately. 
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legal services.  CV methods are imperfect,146 and even if we were to leave 
estimation methods to one side, there are still drawbacks to using WTP as 
our only yardstick for thinking about benefits.147  But this approach gene-
rates defensible estimates: ones that courts, legislatures, and regulators 
have regularly accepted as reasonable.148  From an allocational efficiency 
perspective (and if we accept the utility of cost-benefit analysis in decision 
making), employing contingent valuation would likely be an improvement 
on, or at a minimum, a complement to, existing approaches that seek to 
demonstrate need alone.149 
Still, I do not mean to argue that CV-based benefit estimates ought to 
drive our policy decisions, but only that CV should be considered as a 
plausible method (along with others) to answering one question that mat-
ters to policymakers: not whether there are any benefits at all to providing 
more legal services to low-income individuals (the answer will probably 
always be yes), but whether there are sufficient benefits produced to justify 
the expansion of legal services given their costs and the fact that we live in 
a world of limited resources. 
In trying to answer that question, we should of course contrast CV esti-
mates to estimates produced by other plausible approaches based on real-
world behavior (e.g., trade-off and market analogy methods, in the right 
context).150  In past comparisons, CV methods have performed reasonably 
well, at least in contexts where the good or service is likely to be used by 
the person making the valuation, as opposed to passive use or existence 
value situations.  Thus, when used with care, CV can be a useful tool gen-
 
 146. See generally ARROW ET AL., REPORT OF THE NOAA PANEL ON CONTINGENT VALU-
ATION 9-17 (1993) (on file with author); CONTINGENT VALUATION, supra note 96.  The set 
of drawbacks from using CV also include all of the concerns that regularly attach to survey 
methods generally.  See BOARDMAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 374-76.  For example, re-
searchers have to be careful about how they sample and survey respondents. 
 147. See Frank, supra note 5, at 917-19. 
 148. See, e.g., Portney, supra note 41, at 6-10 (discussing the use of CV in litigation). 
 149. In the nonuse context, however, see Diamond & Hausman, supra note 132, at 46 
(“[W]e think that these [CV] surveys do not have much information to contribute to in-
formed policy-making.  Thus, we conclude that reliance on contingent valuation surveys in 
either damage assessments or in government decision making is basically misguided.”).  A 
few of their concerns carry over to situations in which clients expect to use the good or ser-
vice.  One response to Diamond and Hausman is that policymakers are already being of-
fered flawed information, so CV studies would still be useful so long as they were less 
flawed than needs studies. 
 150. ARROW ET AL., supra note 146, at 7-9; Portney, supra note 41, at 4. 
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erally,151 and may be particularly useful in evaluating the benefits of ex-
panding access to legal services. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay, I make a rough case against the idea that governments 
should make resource allocation decisions solely on the basis of “need” or 
“unnecessary costs” in the legal services context.  After introducing welfare 
economics’ basic tenets of efficient resource allocation, I suggest that com-
paring the costs and benefits of expanding a government program can be 
useful, if only because doing so gives us greater insight into the sacrifices 
we are willing to make as a society to pursue some other goal (like full 
access to the courts).  I then describe the difficult problem of measuring the 
benefits (and costs) of civil legal services programs aimed at serving low-
income communities, and ask whether existing studies of “need” succeed at 
this task.  I conclude that needs studies provide us with some information, 
but much less than policymakers require, to make informed judgments 
about the levels of resources we ought to devote to maintaining or expand-
ing legal services.  As an alternative, I explore the possibility of using cost-
benefit approaches, focusing particularly on contingent valuation ideas, be-
cause CV studies rely on survey methods, much like existing needs studies.  
CV approaches are far from perfect, but they offer the potential to improve 
our resource allocation decisions in the legal services setting, and are thus 
deserving of more attention. 
 
 151. A number of sources provide “best practices” and guidance for the use of CV.  See, 
e.g., ANNA ALBERINI & JAMES R. KAHN, HANDBOOK ON CONTINGENT VALUATION (2006); 
ARROW ET AL., supra note 146; Portney, supra note 41, at 9 (summarizing the NOAA Pan-
el’s 1993 recommendations). 
